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INTRODUCTION: THE PLACE OF AGENCIES IN
POLARIZED GOVERNMENT
Cynthia R. Farina* & Gillian E. Metzger**
Peter Strauss’s The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers
and the Fourth Branch1 reshaped contemporary thinking about the
constitutionality of federal administrative government. When the article
appeared in 1984, the Reagan Revolution was in full swing. Reagan’s
overtly antiregulatory policy stance and his Administration’s advocacy of
a highly formalist and originalist style of constitutional interpretation
fundamentally challenged the post–New Deal administrative state.
Aggressive interpretation of Article II led to controversial strategies of
White House control: centralized rulemaking review, appointment of
agency heads loyal to the President’s (anti)regulatory agenda, and
attacks on institutions of administrative independence such as the independent regulatory commissions and career civil servants.2
The Place of Agencies was a masterful defense of the constitutional
legitimacy of American administrative government. Professor Strauss
insisted on the essential constitutional distinction between the apex—
Congress, the President, and the Supreme Court—and the vast apparatus
of administration beneath. In this view, the Constitution prescribes strict
separation of legislative, executive, and judicial powers only at the apex.3
Below this level, two other structural principles dominate: a separationof-functions requirement rooted in due process and a checks-andbalances concern with avoiding excessive accumulation of power in any
single governmental entity.4 Administrative agencies are constitutional so
long as they have relationships of control and accountability with each of
the actors at the apex: “The three must share the reins of control; means

*
. William G. McRoberts Research Professor in Administration of the Law, Faculty
Director, Cornell eRulemaking Initiative (CeRI), Cornell Law School.
**
. Stanley H. Fuld Professor of Law, Faculty Director, Center for Constitutional
Governance, Columbia Law School.
1. Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and
the Fourth Branch, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 573 (1984) [hereinafter Strauss, Place of Agencies].
2. See David J. Barron, Foreword: From Takeover to Merger: Reforming
Administrative Law in an Age of Agency Politicization, 76 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1095, 1130–
31 (2008) (noting signiﬁcant increase in politicization of appointments and agency
personnel under Reagan Administration); Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114
Harv. L. Rev. 2245, 2277–80 (2001) (describing development of centralized regulatory
review under Reagan Administration); Kevin M. Stack, Obama’s Equivocal Defense of
Agency Independence, 26 Const. Comment. 583, 585–94 (2010) (describing Reagan
Administration’s attack on independent agencies).
3. Strauss, Place of Agencies, supra note 1, at 577–78.
4. Id.
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must be found of assuring that no one of them becomes dominant.”5 In
emphasizing the constitutional need for signiﬁcant relationships between
agencies and all of the “opposed, politically powerful actors at the apex
of government,”6 Professor Strauss pushed back on assertions of unitary
presidential control. Rather, as he developed further in later work, the
President is to be an “overseer,” not a “decider”—a supervisory role
shared in important ways with Congress.7
Our own thinking about separation of powers is so deeply indebted
to Professor Strauss’s work that we relished the opportunity to consider
The Place of Agencies thirty years later. Some things have not changed
much: centralized regulatory review, politicized agency appointments,
and agency independence remain ﬁercely debated.8 More fundamentally,
however, the world seems a very different place. Funding the government
has become an ongoing exercise in political “chicken” that debilitates
agency planning9 and unsettles domestic and international ﬁnancial
markets.10 Delays have so plagued the agency appointments process that
a Democrat-controlled Senate ﬁnally exercised the long-threatened
“nuclear option” of limiting the ﬁlibuster.11 Overall, the productivity of
the 112th and 113th Congresses fell to levels historically associated with
national crises.12 No one would have described the Reagan or Clinton
years as eras of good feeling between the House, Senate, and White
House. Still, major social and economic legislation was enacted and
5. Id. at 579–80.
6. Id. at 581.
7. Peter L. Strauss, Foreword: Overseer, or “The Decider”? The President in
Administrative Law, 75 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 696, 704–05 (2007) [hereinafter Strauss,
Overseer or Decider].
8. The literature on these issues is vast, and Professor Strauss, has not surprisingly,
been a leading participant in the ongoing debate. See, e.g id., at 700–05 (describing and
rejecting claims of unitary executive power by the Bush II Administration); Peter L. Strauss,
Presidential Rulemaking, 72 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 965, 968–75 (1997) (describing increased
presidential role in and politicization of rulemaking). For a sampling of the broader debates
in other scholarship on point, see Peter L. Strauss et al., Gellhorn and Byse’s Administrative
Law: Cases and Comments 213–42, 685–761 (11th ed. 2011) (discussing centralized
regulatory review, presidential direction of agency decisionmaking, agency independence
and presidential removal power, and appointments).
9. See Gillian E. Metzger, Agencies, Polarization, and the States, 115 Colum. L. Rev.
(forthcoming Nov. 2015) (manuscript at 11) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
10. See, e.g., Katy Burne, Andrew Ackerman & Ryan Tracy, Markets Are Anxious Over
Fears of Default, Wall St. J. (Oct. 12, 2013, 12:22 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001
424052702304500404579129801171185802 (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
11. Paul Kane, Reid, Democrats Trigger “Nuclear” Option; Eliminate Most Filibusters on
Nominees, Wash. Post (Nov. 21, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/senatepoised-to-limit-filibusters-in-party-line-vote-that-would-alter-centuries-of-precedent/2013/11/21
/d065cfe8-52b6-11e3-9fe0-fd2ca728e67c_story.html [http://perma.cc/3N4V-GEWL].
12. Daniel Newhauser, No, the 113th Congress Wasn’t the Least Productive Ever,
Nat’l J. (Dec. 23, 2014), http://www.nationaljournal.com/congress/no-the-113th-congress
-wasn-t-the-least-productive-ever-20141223 [http://perma.cc/98J7-WZS7] (citing analyses
of political scientists Sarah Binder and David Mayhew).
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government (despite some conspicuous stutters like the 1995 to 1996
shutdowns), for the most part, moved forward.13 The George W. Bush
years saw increasingly incandescent partisan rhetoric and unparalleled
presidential adventurism, but the perceived exigencies of September 11
and four years of rare uniﬁed party control allowed government, for the
most part, to continue.14 By late in the Bush II Administration, however,
scholars had begun to speak of “broken” institutions,15 and the Obama
years have seen growing pessimism about the capacity of a 200-year-old
constitutional structure to produce reliable, effective governance.16
How does this altered political reality affect the complex interinstitutional roles and dependencies traced out in The Place of Agencies? Are
gridlock and partisan “tribal warfare”17 the new normal at the apex of
national government? If so, the intricate system of separated, checked-andbalanced powers that Professor Strauss so adroitly described may be
vanishing—an anachronism to which lip service must be given, so long as
the Constitution is formally unamended, but which must be mitigated and
circumvented by those seeking reliable, effective governance. If, instead,
hope remains for abating polarization and hyperpartisanship, can the
institutions of administrative government below the apex facilitate this
shift by, for example, providing opportunities for bipartisan engagement
and the emergence of new areas of common ground?
These are very large questions that obviously cannot be resolved in
this setting. The pair of essays that follow do, however, make a start.
In Congressional Polarization: Terminal Constitutional Dysfunction?,
Cynthia Farina looks at the phenomenon of polarization, focusing on the
rancorous and embattled legislative branch the Constitution places at the
forefront of our system of government. Divided into two chambers with
very different representational bases, and saddled by the Constitution
and longstanding practice with various supermajoritarian hurdles to
action, Congress has always suffered signiﬁcant structural challenges as a
political actor—especially as compared with the President.18 Perhaps for
13. See David R. Mayhew, Partisan Balance: Why Political Parties Don’t Kill the U.S.
Constitutional System 45 tbl.2.1, 69 tbl.2.3, 73 tbl.2.4 (2011) (presenting success of Reagan
and Clinton, with other modern Presidents, in getting legislative agendas through Congress).
14. See id. (highlighting passage of USA Patriot Act and other 9/11-driven legislation
as well as Bush II Administration’s overall success from 2005 to 2006 and in early 2001).
15. E.g., Thomas E. Mann & Norman J. Ornstein, The Broken Branch: How Congress
Is Failing America and How to Get It Back on Track 17 (2008).
16. See Cynthia R. Farina, Congressional Polarization: Terminal Constitutional
Dysfunction?, 115 Colum. L. Rev. (forthcoming Nov. 2015) (manuscript at 1–3) (on ﬁle
with the Columbia Law Review).
17. Congress as ‘The Broken Branch,’ Wash. Post (Oct. 11, 2006), http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/10/AR2006101001155.html [http://
perma.cc/WB7Q-5ZHB].
18. See, e.g., The Federalist No. 70, at 423 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961) (contrasting “[d]ecision, activity, secrecy, and despatch” of energetic single
executive with deliberateness of numerous legislature).
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this reason, dire warnings about congressional dysfunction have a
venerable history in American political commentary.19 In recent years,
however, institutional disability seems to have degenerated into institutional incapacity. Now, Congress often manages to be only a spoiler of
others’ initiatives, unable to engage productively in the shared enterprise
of governing contemplated by the Constitution.
Hyperpartisan legislative deadlock has already signiﬁcantly affected
the behavior of the other actors at the apex, as well as the operation of
administrative government beneath.20 If this condition is unlikely to
improve, the constitutional and policy implications are profound.
Balance cannot be maintained, nor can the reins of control over
administration be shared, if one of the principal actors has retreated into
self-absorbed obstructionism. Professor Farina’s contribution reviews the
rich political science literature on polarization to discover what is known
about its nature, degree, and causes. She ﬁnds some core areas of
agreement, much unresolved conﬂict about important dimensions, and
little deﬁnitive evidence about causation. (This last is perhaps fortunate,
for most of the proposed remedies would require changes in the
Constitution, embedded electoral processes, or both.) Most important
for present purposes, she discerns several areas in which the potential
exists for shifts in a depolarizing direction. Things are not certain to get
better—but they are also not nearly so certain as the sound-bites suggest
to stay this bad.
Against this backdrop of guarded optimism, in Agencies, Polarization,
and the States, Gillian Metzger examines how high levels of polarization
have changed regulatory government and how, in turn, agencies might
contribute to changing polarized politics. Partisan warfare conducted
within divided government necessarily affects the relationships of control
and accountability that are the subject of The Place of Agencies. Most
centrally, as legislative deadlock undermines Congress’s ability to direct
agency action, the President is incentivized and empowered to use
agencies as tools for unilateral policymaking. Still, these recognized effects
of polarization tell only part of the story. With broad powers exercisable
without the kinds of inter-institutional agreement that hyperpartisanism
can stymie, agencies continue to govern even in highly polarized times.
This ongoing ability to make and adapt major federal policy enables
agencies to shape, as well as be shaped by, the political environment. A
critical element of this dynamic is the role played by state governments in
federal programs, which can reinforce national political divides but also
motivate new crosscutting alliances.
Professor Metzger examines these complex effects using the
Affordable Care Act (ACA) as a case study on administration and polar19. E. Scott Adler & John D. Wilkerson, Congress and the Politics of Problem Solving
3–4 (2013).
20. See Metzger, supra note 9, passim.
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ization in practice. The ACA stands as the poster child for hyperpartisanship. Repealing Obamacare remains the Republican Party’s unifying
mantra, while the Obama Administration has embraced significant unilateral actions in its zeal to make the Act work. The picture of implementation, however, is far more complex, with red states increasingly
reaching deals with the Administration to expand Medicaid and the
Department of Health and Human Services taking a flexible approach to
bring as many states as possible on board. The story of the ACA thus
reinforces the need for more nuanced accounts of the place of agencies in
a polarized world.
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CONGRESSIONAL POLARIZATION:
TERMINAL CONSTITUTIONAL DYSFUNCTION?
Cynthia R. Farina*
Political polarization has become a major focus in contemporary
discussions on congressional activity and governance. The tone of these
discussions has grown increasingly grim, as many political scientists
argue that a constitutional system of divided and shared powers
hardens current levels of partisan warfare into legislative gridlock.
Proposals for reform abound. Scholars and political commentators have
called for modiﬁcations to the electoral process and to party structure,
for additional oversight of the culture among members of Congress, and
for increased attention to demographics and economic inequality within
the electorate. These proposals sometimes conﬂict, and usually face
daunting legal or political obstacles to adoption.
In an effort to better assess the likelihood that congressional
dysfunction will be the norm going forward, this Essay reviews and
synthesizes recent political science literature with the goal of sorting out
what we know—and, perhaps more important, do not know—about the
nature, extent, and causes of congressional polarization. The Essay begins
by discussing standard metrics of congressional polarization and describing
alternative approaches that challenge the standard account as overly
simplistic. It then looks at historical trends to consider whether the
contemporary situation is truly anomalous. Next, it considers the many
theories put forth to explain the phenomenon, focusing initially on whether
congressional polarization can be explained by polarization in the electorate
and then moving to proposals around the electoral process, party structure
and culture, and demographics. Finding little support in the literature for
the notion that the challenged structures and practices are actually driving
legislative polarization, the Essay concludes by suggesting that the rhetoric
around congressional polarization—particularly around the likely
continuation of partisan warfare and legislative gridlock—is far more
negative than the existing evidence can justify.
INTRODUCTION
“[P]olarization is the deﬁning narrative of our time.”
~ Joshua Huder 1
In 2012, two congressional scholars from opposite political poles—
Thomas Mann of the Brookings Institution and Norman Ornstein of the
American Enterprise Institute—collaborated on a book2 arguing that
*
. William G. McRoberts Research Professor in Administration of the Law, Faculty
Director, Cornell eRulemaking Initiative (CeRI), Cornell Law School.

1. Joshua Huder, Political Parties Are Often Too Convenient an Explanation, Rule 22
(Apr. 28, 2015), http://rule22blog.org/2015/04/28/political-parties-are-often-too-convenientan-explanation/ [http://perma.cc/M5N4-T6ZD].
2. Thomas E. Mann & Norman J. Ornstein, It’s Even Worse than It Looks: How the
American Constitutional System Collided with the New Politics of Extremism (2012).
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hyperpartisanship has “led Congress—and the United States—to the brink
of institutional collapse.”3 Writing more recently in the Wall Street Journal,
Brookings scholar William Galston echoed this concern: “Abroad as well as
at home, observers question America’s ability to govern itself as the times
require.”4
Political polarization has absorbed the attention of political scientists
over the last fifteen years.5 As these examples suggest, the tone of this work
tends to be grim: The parties, especially the Republicans, have increasingly
acted like parliamentary parties in a winner-take-all system—while trying to
govern in a constitutional system of divided and shared powers with multiple
vetogates.6 The resulting institutional stalemate, and associated political
misbehavior, has led a wide range of scholars and political commenters to
call for significant modifications to the Constitution, the organization and
the operation of electoral politics, or both.7 That such reforms face
formidable legal, political, and institutional obstacles only heightens the
apocalyptic tenor of the discussion.
It has thus become impossible to think about the place of agencies in
contemporary American government without first coming to terms with
the political polarization that seems to jeopardize Congress’s constitutional
responsibility for regulatory oversight. If the level of dysfunctional partisan
conflict is unlikely to shift without reforms that are unlikely to occur, then
the Straussian model of agency legitimation—which rests on relationships
of genuine control and accountability with each of the three principal
constitutional actors8—must be fundamentally revisited. A perpetually
gridlocked Congress is unable, in Professor Strauss’s metaphor, to “share
the reins of control.”9 The resulting imbalance in control and account-

3. It’s Even Worse Than It Looks, Basic Books, http://www.basicbooks.com/fulldetails?isbn=9780465074730 [http://perma.cc/F2N2-4Q42] (last visited Aug. 30, 2015).
4. Willliam A. Galston, Americans Are as Polarized as Washington, Wall St. J. (June 3,
2014, 7:16 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/william-a-galston-americans-are-as-polarized-aswashington-1401837373 (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
5. E.g., Red and Blue Nation? Characteristics and Causes of American’s Polarized
Politics: Volume One (Pietro S. Nivola & David W. Brady eds., 2006); Red and Blue Nation?
Consequences and Correction of America’s Polarized Politics: Volume Two (Pietro S. Nivola &
David W. Brady eds., 2008); Michael Barber & Nolan McCarty, Causes and Consequences of
Polarization, in Negotiating Agreement in Politics 19 (Jane Mansbridge & Cathie Jo Martin
eds., 2013), http://www.apsanet.org/Portals/54/APSA%20Files/publications/MansbridgeTF
_FinalDraft.pdf [http://perma.cc/9HCK-WQUB] [hereinafter Barber & McCarty, Causes and
Consequences].
6. See Morris P. Fiorina, Gridlock Is Bad. The Alternative Is Worse, Wash. Post:
Monkey Cage (Feb. 25, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp
/2014/02/25/gridlock-is-bad-the-alternative-is-worse/ [http://perma.cc/ASU3-Y2K9].
7. See discussion infra Part IV (reviewing various remedial proposals).
8. See Peter Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers
and the Fourth Branch, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 573, 577–80 (1984).
9. Id. at 580.
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ability would raise hard questions about the constitutionality, as well as the
wisdom, of an increasingly president-centered regulatory state.10
This Essay reviews and synthesizes recent political science literature
with the goal of sorting out what we know—and, perhaps more important,
do not know—about the nature, extent, and causes of congressional
polarization. By focusing in particular on systematic studies and evidencebased conclusions, the Essay seeks to better assess the likelihood that dysfunction in the legislative branch will be the norm in regulatory politics
going forward. The discussion proceeds as follows:
Part I explains the most commonly used metric of congressional
polarization: roll-call voting. This metric shows steadily increasing distance
between the Republican and Democratic caucuses in both chambers since
the 1980s; this is largely accounted for by the Republican caucus becoming
more conservative. Part I then examines alternative methodological approaches that reach a less pessimistic, or at least far more complex, conclusion about Congress’s continuing capacity for bipartisan action. These
approaches—which examine a range of qualitative as well as quantitative
evidence—caution against the over-simplification of an exclusive focus on
roll-call votes.
Part II focuses on historical trends in congressional polarization. Since
the post–Civil War era—when today’s Republican and Democratic parties
first emerged—polarization levels (measured by roll-call voting) have
shown considerable volatility. The contemporary level is a record, but
Congress has “recovered” from earlier periods of high polarization. The
previous high point, 1890 to 1910, is especially noteworthy because of
several apparent similarities with the present era.
Part III considers the extent to which legislative polarization can be
explained by polarization in the electorate. If divisions between Republican
and Democratic members reflect extreme partisan conflict among those
they represent, then congressional dysfunction is symptomatic of a far larger
problem and is even more likely to be intractable. Although there is
disagreement among political scientists, it appears that polarization is largely
a phenomenon of “elite” politically active citizens, and even these individuals tend to depart from their party’s position on at least one issue they
care about. Most of the electorate hold a mix of conservative and –
preferences that are not well represented by either party’s current platform.
This heterogeneity can potentially destabilize partisan gridlock, as both
parties are pressured to redefine their issue positions to secure the loyalty of
a critical number of these votes.
Part IV reviews other kinds of explanations offered for congressional
polarization, and the remedies advocated. The proposed explanations
range from assertions that current electoral structures and practices distort
10. See Gillian E. Metzger, Agencies, Polarization, and the States, 115 Colum. L. Rev.
(forthcoming Nov. 2015) (manuscript at 12–17) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review)
(describing nature and impact of presidential unilateralism).
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representational outcomes, through arguments that the political parties
have too much, or too little, power, to theories about party culture and
broad population demographics. The proposed remedies often conflict.
Given the low probability of accomplishing most of these remedies at the
national level, it is perhaps fortunate that there is little solid evidence that
the challenged structures and practices are actually driving legislative
polarization—or that the proposed reforms would succeed in reducing it.
This review ultimately suggests that the rhetoric around congressional
polarization—particularly around the likely continuation of partisan
warfare and legislative gridlock—is far more negative than the existing
evidence can justify. This is not meant to deny that Congress in recent
years has experienced significant problems in fulfilling its constitutional
role of policymaking and oversight. Rather, it is an argument against
viewing the present era as so exceptional that it falls outside the historical
ebb and flow of partisan contention, and beyond the capacity of existing
constitutional institutions to survive.
I. DETERMINING THE EXTENT AND NATURE OF
CONGRESSIONAL POLARIZATION
“To say simply that parties are polarized is to deﬁne what parties are.”
~ Brady & Han 11
“Polarization” does not have a uniform, clearly articulated deﬁnition
among political scientists, but with respect to Congress, the term
generally refers to the average distance between the preferences of the
median Democratic and Republican Members.12 The most widely
employed metric, “DW-Nominate,” uses roll-call vote behavior to array
legislators relative to their colleagues on a liberal/conservative scale.13
Long-term “bridge” legislators are used to build comparisons across
Congresses over time.14 Figure 1 shows the results: Since the 1970s, the
Republican and Democratic caucuses have become increasingly

11. David W. Brady & Hahrie C. Han, Polarization Then and Now: A Historical
Perspective, in Red and Blue Nation? Characteristics and Causes of American’s Polarized
Politics: Volume One, supra note 5, at 119, 119–20 [hereinafter Brady & Han, Then and
Now].
12. E.g., Barber & McCarty, Causes and Consequences, supra note 5, at 20; cf. Boris Shor,
How U.S. State Legislatures Are Polarized and Getting More Polarized, Wash. Post: Monkey
Cage (Jan. 14, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/01/14/
how-u-s-state-legislatures-are-polarized-and-getting-more-polarized-in-2-graphs/ [http://perma
.cc/4ZPR-RTS7] (using same definition for state legislatures).
13. The Polarization of the Congressional Parties, Voteview, http://voteview.com/
political_polarization_2014.htm [http://perma.cc/4UGW-BMB6] [hereinafter Voteview,
Polarization of Parties] (last updated Mar. 21, 2015).
14. Nolan McCarty et al., Polarization Is Real (and Asymmetric), Wash. Post: Monkey Cage
(May 15, 2012), http://themonkeycage.org/2012/05/15/polarization-is-real-and-asymmetric/
[http://perma.cc/36M5-VWDR] [hereinafter McCarty, Polarization is Asymmetric].
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homogenous and distant from each other. Polarization is greatest in the
House, but the Senate is not far behind, with the two trending together.
FIGURE 1:PARTY POLARIZATION 1879–2014
DISTANCE BETWEEN THE PARTIES ON THE
(LIBERAL–CONSERVATIVE) DIMENSION15

The conclusion that Congress is highly polarized encompasses three
distinct but reinforcing observations. First, the two major political parties
have become internally more ideologically consistent across the range of
social and economic issues (ideological coherence).16 Second, members
have become better sorted by party (partisan sorting).17 The moderate
Republican and conservative Democratic wings evident through much of
the twentieth century have largely disappeared.18 Finally, the distance
between median party preferences has increased in both chambers
(ideological divergence).19 One measure is the National Journal’s annual ideological rankings: In 1982, 344 members of the House were located
between the most liberal Republican and the most conservative Democrat;
by 2013, there were four.20 Fifty-eight senators occupied this space in 1982;
none in 2013.21
15. Voteview, Polarization of Parties, supra note 13.
16. Nathaniel Persily, Introduction, in Solutions to Political Polarization in America 1,
5 (Nathaniel Persily ed., 2015); see also Barber & McCarty, Causes and Consequences,
supra note 5, at 22–23 (describing “intraparty cleavages on almost all issues”).
17. See Marc J. Hetherington, Putting Polarization in Perspective, 39 Brit. J. Pol. Sci.
413, 419–22 (2009) (describing factors contributing to “Big Sort”).
18. See id. at 421; see also infra Part II (discussing post–Civil War history of polarization).
19. Hetherington, supra note 17, at 415–19, 446.
20. Chris Cillizza, The Ideological Middle Is Dead in Congress. Really Dead., Wash. Post:
The Fix (Apr. 10, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2014/04/10/theideological-middle-is-dead-in-congress-really-dead/ [http://perma.cc/6EYV-NVV3] [hereinafter Cillizza, Ideological Middle].
21. Id.
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A.

Asymmetricality: Republicans vs. Democrats

Most researchers conclude that this ideological divergence has been
asymmetric, with Republicans shifting further from the center than
Democrats.22 If true, this implies that the future course of congressional
polarization is particularly tied to actions of the GOP and Republican
congressional leaders.23
Evidence of the asymmetry appears in Figures 2A and 2B, in which
the DW-Nominate data reveal a steeper Republican movement toward
the extremes beginning in the 1980s.

22. E.g., Alan I. Abramowitz, The Disappearing Center: Engaged Citizens, Polarization,
and American Democracy, 139–42 (2010) [hereinafter Abramowitz, Disappearing Center];
Barber & McCarty, Causes and Consequences, supra note 5, at 21; McCarty, Polarization Is
Asymmetric, supra note 14.
23. See infra section IV.C (assessing explanations and remedies focused on
Republican Party).
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FIGURE 2A: DW NOMINATE SCORES FOR HOUSE24

FIGURE 2B: DW NOMINATE SCORES FOR SENATE25

Further evidence comes from separating the DW-Nominate data into
Southern and Northern Democrats. Figures 3A and 3B reveal that most of
the leftward movement of the Democratic median over time is explained
by the exodus of white Southern Democrats that began in the Civil Rights
era. With views on race and some economic issues that were considerably
more conservative than those of many Republicans, their departure left
the ideological score of the modern Democratic caucus close to that of

24. L.J. Zigerell, Are Republicans Really Driving Congressional Polarization? Maybe Not.,
Wash. Post: Monkey Cage (Sept. 11, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkeycage/wp/2014/09/11/are-republicans-really-driving-congressional-polarization-maybe-not/
[http://perma.cc/TJH2-QD5X].
25. Id.
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Northern Democrats of the 1970s (-0.4).26 Republicans also experienced
some partisan sorting, as white Southern conservatives entered and more
liberal, predominantly Eastern “Rockefeller Republicans” disappeared,27
but the average score of the Republican caucus has shifted substantially
right, from +0.2 in the 1970s to more than +0.6.
FIGURE 3A: HOUSE 1879–2014
PARTY MEANS ON LIBERAL/CONSERVATIVE DIMENSION28

26. John H. Aldrich, Did Hamilton, Jefferson, and Madison “Cause” the U.S.
Government Shutdown? The Institutional Path from an Eighteenth Century Republic to a
Twenty-First Century Democracy, 13 Persp. on Pol. 7, 16 & ﬁg.4 (2015); see also
Hetherington, supra note 17, at 421 (discussing impact of Democrats’ “embrace of civil
rights”).
27. See Hetherington, supra note 17, at 421.
28. Keith T. Poole, Howard Rosenthal & Christopher Hare, House and Senate
Polarization 1879–2014, Voteview Blog (Dec. 22, 2014), https://voteviewblog.wordpress.com
/2014/12/22/house-and-senate-polarization-1879-2014/ [https://perma.cc/HET4-LPA7].
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FIGURE 3B: SENATE 1879–2014
PARTY MEANS ON LIBERAL/CONSERVATIVE DIMENSION29

Yet another measure of asymmetry is the percentage of “non-centrist”
members (those whose DW-Nominate score is below -0.5 or above +0.5): In
the House, this describes more than 80% of Republicans and about 10% of
Democrats; in the Senate, it includes just over 40% of Republicans and
15% of Democrats.30
Scholars who disagree that divergence is asymmetrical argue that
methods other than DW-Nominate for estimating ideological shift show
more parity between the parties, or even that Democrats have shifted
further from the center than Republicans.31 This remains a decidedly
minority view among political scientists, however.
B.

Incumbents vs. Newcomers

The predominant view is that ideological divergence has been
driven not by incumbents shifting their ideological position, but rather
by the inﬂux of new Members—especially Republicans—who are more
extreme than their predecessors.32 Figure 4 shows this trend.

29. Id.
30. Voteview, Polarization of Parties, supra note 13.
31. See, e.g., Zigerell, supra note 24. Zigerell points to Adam Bonica, Mapping the
Ideological Marketplace, 58 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 367, 367–70 (2013), which estimates ideology
based on campaign donors.
32. See, e.g., Adam Bonica, The Punctuated Origins of Senate Polarization, 39 Legis.
Stud. Q. 5, 6 (2014) (collecting literature on member replacement driving polarization); Keith
T. Poole, Changing Minds? Not in Congress!, 131 Pub. Choice 435, 448–49 (2007) (finding,
from roll-call voting, members of Congress do not shift ideological position over time). But see
Bonica, supra, at 12–13 (using different methodology to discern two distinct phases in Senate:
incumbent replacement through mid–1990s and ideological “adaptation” more recently).
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FIGURE 4:DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CONTINUING AND NEWLY
ELECTED MEMBERS TO THE U.S. HOUSE ON DW-NOMINATE FIRST
DIMENSION SCORES, 107TH–112TH CONGRESSES33

C.

An Alternative, More Complex Picture

The DW-Nominate data seem to justify dire predictions about
intractably dysfunctional government: As legislators have become sorted
with near-perfect accuracy into more ideologically coherent and divergent
parties, opportunities for coalition building appear to have disappeared.
However, the work of several scholars challenges the parsimoniousness of
the standard account.
One group of challenges directly concerns the DW-Nominate
methodology. Roll-call vote tabulation does not break down or differentially
weight votes by importance or ideological content. So, although the data are
conventionally presented on a liberal/conservative “ideological” scale, what
is actually being measured is party-line voting.34 Frances Lee’s substantive

33. Aldrich, supra note 26, at 16 ﬁg.4.
34. See, e.g., Nolan McCarty, What We Know and Do Not Know About Our Polarized
Politics, in Political Polarization in American Politics 1, 3 ﬁg.1 (Daniel J. Hopkins & John
Sides eds., 2015) (renaming Y-axis “party conﬂict”); cf. David A. Bateman, Josh Clinton &
John Lapinski, A House Divided? Roll Calls, Policy Differences, and Polarization from
1877–2011, at 11 (Feb. 26, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.gsb.stanford.edu
/sites/default/ﬁles/documents/pe_03_15_Clinton.pdf (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law
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analysis of more than twenty years of Senate votes confirms that many issues
on the congressional agenda lack an obvious ideological valence.35 Hence,
something besides sincere ideological differences drives increased party-line
voting. This “something,” Professor Lee argues, is “team play” behavior—
the will to win and desire to defeat the other party.36 To be sure, both
ideology and intense competition for power will lower incentives for
bipartisan cooperation, but tactics may be more open to reassessment and
change than ideologically rooted conflict.37
A different methodological challenge comes from David Bateman,
Josh Clinton, and John Lapinski, who argue that DW-Nominate’s use of
“bridge legislators” is insufficient to permit accurate comparisons across
Congresses “wherever there has been a systematic shift—leftward or
rightward—in both member preferences and the policy space.”38 Using
qualitative historical data about the passage of civil rights and Social
Security legislation to produce adjusted estimates of Members’ ideological
location over time, they find considerably lower levels of interparty conflict
than the standard DW-Nominate estimates.39
A second group of scholars challenges the reductionism of roll-call
vote tabulation by emphasizing that recorded votes represent only a
portion of Member activity. These scholars examine multiple measures of
legislative behavior and productivity over time and paint a far more complex (and positive) picture of congressional functionality. Laurel
Harbridge’s study of bipartisanship in the House examines behavior before
and after roll-call voting to find “a latent but remarkably persistent level of
substantive bipartisan agreement.”40 This agreement is evidenced in part
by bipartisan co-sponsorship of bills, which declined by less than 20%
during the twenty-year period when bipartisan roll-call voting was
declining more than 60%.41 Agenda-setting—the leadership’s manipReview) (“[N]othing in the statistical model ensures that either dimension has any
necessary relationship to policy outcomes in an ideological space.”).
35. Frances E. Lee, Beyond Ideology: Politics, Principles, and Partisanship in the U.S.
Senate 71–73 (2009) [hereinafter Lee, Beyond Ideology]. Professor Lee concluded that “a little
more than 40 percent” of Senate roll-call votes from 1981 to 2004 had ideological content. Id.
at 65. The 2013 National Journal rankings, discussed in Cillizza, Ideological Middle, supra note
20, which use a subset of roll-call votes thought to “show ideological distinctions between
members,” reached a comparable conclusion for the Senate (40%); it found a much lower
percentage (17%) of ideological votes in the House. How the Vote Ratings Are Calculated, Nat’l
Journal (Feb. 6, 2014), http://www.nationaljournal.com/2013-vote-ratings/how-the-voteratings-are-calculated-20140206 [http://perma.cc/Q4VS-CDBZ].
36. Lee, Beyond Ideology, supra note 35, at 181–93.
37. See discussion infra section IV.C (discussing explanations and remedies focused
on party culture and strategic electoral behavior).
38. Bateman, Clinton & Lapinski, supra note 34, at 40.
39. See id. at 31–37.
40. Laurel Harbridge, Is Bipartisanship Dead? Policy Agreement and Agenda-Setting
in the House of Representatives 2–3 (2015) [hereinafter Harbridge, Is Bipartisanship
Dead?].
41. Id. at 62.
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ulation of which measures get to the floor and result in a recorded vote—
thus obscures the persistence of cross-party alliances and heightens the
apparent degree of partisan polarization.42
E. Scott Adler and John D. Wilkerson similarly conclude that
“[c]onflict in Congress is neither all consuming nor is it the defining
characteristic of lawmaking.”43 Examining a wide variety of qualitative and
quantitative data, they conclude that, despite polarization, “legislators do
engage in problem solving on a routine and sustained basis.”44 David
Mayhew, whose landmark study of congressional productivity challenged
conventional wisdom about the negative impact of divided government,45
more recently assembled a fine-grained dataset on the legislative progress
of major proposals from Harry Truman to George W. Bush.46 Finding that
modern presidents of both parties generally get their major proposals
enacted, he concludes that the constitutional system, in operation over
time, tends to be majoritarian and self-correcting.47 Each branch eventually pulls back if it deviates too much from the others, and institutions tend
to move back toward the median voter.48
D. The Bottom Line
Based on the widely used empirical measure, DW-Nominate,
congressional polarization has been steadily and consistently increasing
since the 1980s. This trend appears to be driven primarily by the increased
extremism of Republican (versus Democratic) and new (versus incumbent) members.
These results accord with widespread perceptions of a Congress
increasingly mired in partisan “tribal warfare,”49 but the DW-Nominate
method has important limitations. Results are typically presented on a
liberal/conservative scale even though the underlying roll-call data are not
limited to votes with an ideological valence. What the analyses actually reveal
is the extent of party-line voting. This is certainly a measure of partisan
conflict, but such voting reflects a range of motivations more diverse, and
potentially more open to negotiation, than ideological commitment. This
leads to the second limitation. Roll-call voting is crucially important, but it is
42. See id. at 62–83.
43. E. Scott Adler & John D. Wilkerson, Congress and the Politics of Problem Solving
4 (2012).
44. Id. at 7.
45. David R. Mayhew, Divided We Govern: Party Control, Lawmaking, and
Investigations 1946–2002 (2d ed. 2005).
46. David R. Mayhew, Partisan Balance: Why Political Parties Don’t Kill the U.S.
Constitutional System (2011) [hereinafter Mayhew, Partisan Balance].
47. See id. at xiv–xvii, xix–xx, 165–67.
48. See id. at 170.
49. Ornstein Says There’s No One Cause for Dysfunctional Government, Claremont
Courier (Mar. 23, 2013), https://www.claremont-courier.com/articles/opinion/t6911ornstein [https://perma.cc/V9U5-SFDR].

12

only one species of congressional behavior. Moreover, it is significantly
shaped by the leadership’s agenda-setting power, and so can over-predict the
level of entrenched party conflict relative to other indicators such as cosponsored legislation. As Joshua Huder puts it, “Roll call votes are both a
very good measure of polarization and a clearly biased sample.”50
Researchers who look at the wider range of Member behaviors do not deny
that congressional polarization is a real concern, but their work paints a
more complex picture in which significant bipartisan collaboration
continues to exist.
II. CONGRESSIONAL POLARIZATION IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT
“[T]he truly unusual historical period in US Congressional polarization is the
period of bipartisanship immediately following the Second World War.”
~ Han & Brady51
Political parties are not a new phenomenon in American government, and partisan discord is as old as Hamilton’s Federalists and
Jefferson’s Democratic-Republicans.52 Similarly, although practices around
the ﬁlibuster changed considerably over the twentieth century,53 the
structural components of lawmaking gridlock have existed for more than
200 years. Hence, historical patterns of polarization seem relevant to
understanding, and to predicting the likely permanence of, contemporary congressional dysfunction.
A.

How Much Partisan Conﬂict Is “Normal” for U.S. Politics?

On its face, the message of history is straightforward and ominous: As
shown in Figure 1 above, the standard DW-Nominate measure reveals a
higher level of polarization in both chambers than at any time in the history
of the two major parties. In the modern post–World War II era, the trend of
partisan conflict has been disturbingly monotonic and accelerating.
For some researchers, however, history tells a different story. In this
account, signiﬁcant levels of congressional polarization are the norm in
U.S. politics. Mid-twentieth-century lows are the anomaly, a period when
partisan conﬂict was suppressed by politically expedient accommodation

50. Joshua Huder, Left or Right? Who’s Further from the Middle?, Rule 22 (May 28,
2015), http://rule22blog.org/2015/05/28/left-or-right-whos-further-from-the-middle/ [http://
perma.cc/A9K3-4D7Y].
51. Hahrie Han & David W. Brady, A Delayed Return to Historical Norms:
Congressional Party Polarization After the Second World War, 37 Brit. J. Pol. Sci. 505, 531
(2007) [hereinafter Han & Brady, Historical Norms].
52. See Aldrich, supra note 26, at 8–10.
53. See Eric Schickler, Disjointed Pluralism: Institutional Innovation and the Development
of the U.S. Congress 220–24 (2001) (describing increase in exploitation of filibuster).

13

of Southern racial repression.54 Political blogger Matthew Yglesias gives a
more emotive but accurate explication of this reading of the history:
[I]t really is remarkable that for all the bellyaching about the
decline of bipartisan behavior in DC there’s very little attention
paid to the fact that there are actual reasons this has happened
beyond Newt Gingrich being a meany and bloggers being too
shrill. The Jim Crow South gave rise to an odd structure of
American political institutions whereby both of the parties
contained substantial ideological diversity. This had the beneﬁt
of setting the stage for a wide array of cross-cutting alliances. It
came, however, at the cost of consigning a substantial portion of
the population to life under a brutal system of apartheid
ruthlessly upheld through systematic violence.
After that system collapsed, there was a two decade or so
period during which the voters and parties were re-aligning
themselves during which we had cross-cutting alliances but no
apartheid. And now the aligning process is done, so we have two
parties where essentially all Democrats are to the left of
essentially all Republicans and so you have relatively few
genuinely bipartisan coalitions.55
B.

Is Current Polarization Different from Earlier High-Conﬂict Periods?

Because neither party competition nor institutional arrangements
vulnerable to partisan gridlock are new features of American government,
earlier periods of extreme party conflict may help understand and predict
the course of contemporary events. The previous high point from 1890 to
1910, when the country was undergoing major economic transitions and
debating the U.S. role in a changing international order, seems especially
relevant. Thomas Carsey and Geoffrey Layman have argued that the
number of issues dividing today’s parties is uniquely large, leaving few
crosscutting issues around which new coalitions might form.56 But other
scholars identify multiple similarities between the present and the 1890 to
1910 era including, a “resurgence in religious activity,” a “melding of
moral and economic issues,” and partisan debates “laden with moral
overtones”;57 party affiliation becoming a “social as well as ideological
phenomenon”;58 large population shifts within the country and great

54. See, e.g., Aldrich, supra note 26, at 14; Brady & Han, Then and Now, supra note
11, at 130; Han & Brady, Historical Norms, supra note 51, at 531; Hetherington, supra
note 17, at 421.
55. Matthew Yglesias, It’s the Structure, Stupid, Atlantic (Aug. 20, 2007), http://
www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2007/08/its-the-structure-stupid/45893/ [http://perma
.cc/N7HN-T5U7].
56. See Thomas Carsey & Geoffrey Layman, Our Politics Is Polarized on More Issues
than Ever Before, in Political Polarization in American Politics, supra note 34, at 23, 27–28
57. Brady & Han, Then and Now, supra note 11, at 150–51.
58. Id. at 136.
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disparities of wealth;59 close electoral competition such that small voter
shifts could swing control from one party to the other;60 and a period of
tight leadership discipline that established a “highly centralized and
intensely partisan House.”61
Going back even further, John Aldrich argues that the turn of the
nineteenth century saw comparably high levels of conﬂict between
Federalists and Democratic-Republicans, as well as familiar patterns that
included “increased partisan polarization, spreading over new dimensions of politics and policy,” “close electoral parity between the two
parties,” and ruthless strategic behavior to gain electoral advantage.62
Mann and Ornstein have emphasized a cultural dimension, which,
they argue, sets contemporary congressional polarization apart. They
perceive an unparalleled level of acrimony, intolerance, disrespect of
established norms of professional behavior, publicly expressed disdain of
other members and the President, and tactical ruthlessness.63 The emergence of strident niche-oriented radio and cable channels helps fuel
partisan antipathy.64 However, Professors Brady and Han point to eras
when members settled debates with physical assaults and “the aptly named
sergeant at arms” removed weapons from arriving representatives,65 while
Kerwin Swint has documented that vituperation and scurrilous public
attacks on the opposition date back at least to 1800 and the presidential
contest between Thomas Jefferson and John Adams.66 Moreover,
newspapers in the nineteenth century were notoriously partisan vehicles
that blithely sacrificed factual accuracy and objective reporting in order to
“‘convert the doubters, recover the wavering, and hold the committed.’”67

59. Morris P. Fiorina, America’s Missing Moderates: Hiding in Plain Sight, Am. Int.,
Mar./Apr. 2013, at 58, 66–67 (2013) [hereinafter Fiorina, Missing Moderates].
60. Brady & Han, Then and Now, supra note 11, at 134.
61. Hetherington, supra note 17, at 427.
62. Aldrich, supra note 26, at 9.
63. See Thomas E. Mann & Norman J. Ornstein, It’s Even Worse than It Looks: How
the American Constitutional System Collided with the New Politics of Extremism 31–43 (2nd
prtg. 2013) [hereinafter Mann & Ornstein, Even Worse than It Looks] (discussing impact of
Newt Gingrich’s tactics); infra section IV.C (discussing rise in “toxic party culture”).
64. See Mann & Ornstein, Even Worse than It Looks, supra note 63, at 58–67.
65. Brady & Han, Then and Now, supra note 11, at 120–21.
66. Kerwin Swint, Founding Fathers’ Dirty Campaign, CNN: Mental Floss (Aug. 22,
2008, 10:05 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2008/LIVING/wayoﬂife/08/22/mf.campaignslurs
.slogans [http://perma.cc/NM5N-NR4A]; see also Kerwin C. Swint, Mudslingers: The Top
25 Negative Political Campaigns of All Time 183–92 (2006) (ranking election of 1800 as
ﬁfth most negative campaign in U.S. history).
67. James L. Baughman, The Fall and Rise of Partisan Journalism, U. Wis. Ctr. for
Journalism Ethics (Apr. 20, 2011), https://ethics.journalism.wisc.edu/2011/04/20/the-fall
-and-rise-of-partisan-journalism/#_edn1 [http://perma.cc/4KSQ-MQ45] (quoting William
E. Gienapp, “Politics Seem to Enter into Everything”: Political Culture in the North, 1840–
1860, in Essays on American Antebellum Politics, 1840–1860, at 14, 41 (Steven E. Maizlish
& John J. Kushma eds., 1982)).
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In sum, although current levels of partisan misbehavior and media
manipulation are undoubtedly high, they may not be historical anomalies.
C.

The Bottom Line

The inquiry into history follows what is becoming a familiar theme: A
seemingly straightforward and discouraging answer becomes, on deeper
examination, far more nuanced and less relentlessly pessimistic. The
current level of congressional polarization is the highest since the Civil
War. However, the frame of reference for judging “normal” levels of
partisan conflict is skewed by an era of bipartisan harmony purchased with
racial appeasement. Polarization levels have demonstrably varied over
time. There is no clear political science consensus on whether the present
era is truly exceptional or instead has parallels with earlier periods of
heightened congressional polarization—particularly the previous high
point from 1890 to 1910—that did eventually abate.
III. CAN CONGRESSIONAL POLARIZATION BE EXPLAINED BY POLARIZATION
IN THE ELECTORATE?
“For a few years I’ve been fascinated by the idea that, in American politics, the
perception of polarization is larger than polarization itself.”
~Andrew Gelman68
Acknowledging the role of the Civil Rights movement in ending
an era of (artificially) low polarization does not explain why partisan
conflict in Congress has continued to increase steadily in the
intervening decades. The most obvious hypothesis would be that
Congress has become more polarized because the electorate has become more polarized. This Part begins by looking at two competing
portraits of voting-eligible adults, both of which are drawn from a
large recent national survey of political attitudes. Then it describes
the similarly conflicted views of political scientists.
A.

Two Hostile Camps or Many Cross-Pressured Clusters? The Pew Polarization
Study

In June 2014, the Pew Research Center released a much-anticipated
report based on one of the largest studies of political attitudes outside
the long-running American National Election Studies (ANES).69 Pew’s
survey capped a period that epitomized polarized congressional politics:
budget sequestration, months of dancing at the edge of the ﬁscal cliff,
and the lingering death of immigration reform. So it was no surprise
68. Andrew Gelman, The Exaggeration of Political Polarization in America, Monkey
Cage (Feb. 5, 2013), http://themonkeycage.org/2013/02/05/the-exaggeration-of-politicalpolarization-in-america/ [http://perma.cc/PQ64-RL4Q].
69. American National Election Studies, http://www.electionstudies.org/ [http://
perma.cc/TG6C-KJ67] (last visited Aug. 12, 2015).
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when the report—dismally titled Political Polarization in the American
Public: How Increasing Ideological Uniformity and Partisan Antipathy Affect
Politics, Compromise and Everyday Life 70—described a citizenry that
mirrored all the dimensions of congressional polarization:
 “Republicans and Democrats are more divided along
ideological lines—and partisan antipathy is deeper and more
extensive—than at any point in the last two decades. These
trends manifest themselves in myriad ways, both in politics and
in everyday life.”71
 “In each party, the share with a highly negative view of the
opposing party has more than doubled since 1994. Most of these
intense partisans believe the opposing party’s policies ‘are so
misguided that they threaten the nation’s well-being.’”72
 “People with down-the-line ideological positions—especially
conservatives—are more likely than others to say that most of
their close friends share their political views. Liberals and
conservatives disagree over where they want to live, the kind of
people they want to live around and even whom they would
welcome into their families.”73
 “[A]t a time of increasing gridlock on Capitol Hill, many on
both the left and the right think the outcome of political
negotiations between Obama and Republican leaders should be
that their side gets more of what it wants.”74
Only by persevering to the end of this negative account could a
reader discover that the situation was perhaps not nearly so dire:
These sentiments are not shared by all—or even most—
Americans. The majority do not have uniformly conservative or
liberal views. Most do not see either party as a threat to the
nation. And more believe their representatives in government
should meet halfway to resolve contentious disputes rather than
hold out for more of what they want.75
The topline bullet points of the report got considerable coverage in
news reports and political blogs; the qualifying language that provided
context was rarely picked up.76
70. Pew Research Ctr., Political Polarization in the American Public: How Increasing
Ideological Uniformity and Partisan Antipathy Affect Politics, Compromise and Everyday
Life (2014), http://www.people-press.org/ﬁles/2014/06/6-12-2014-Political-PolarizationRelease.pdf [http://perma.cc/Z9F4-ZFXK] [hereinafter Pew, Polarization in the Public].
71. Id. at 6.
72. Id. at 6–7.
73. Id. at 7.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 8 (emphasis added); see also id. at 77–78 (providing more detailed explanation of differences between majority and polarized minority views).
76. E.g., Chris Cillizza, The 1 Chart that Explains Everything You Need to Know About
Partisanship in America, Wash. Post: The Fix (Jan. 7, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com
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Two weeks later, Pew released a second report—Beyond Red vs. Blue:
The Political Typology—Fragmented Center Poses Election Challenges for Both
Parties77—analyzing additional data gathered in the same survey. This
report, which got little coverage even on Pew’s own blog, offered a very
different framing:
Partisan polarization—the vast and growing gap between
Republicans and Democrats—is a deﬁning feature of politics
today. But beyond the ideological wings, which make up a
minority of the public, the political landscape includes a center
that is large and diverse, uniﬁed by frustration with politics and
little else. As a result, both parties face formidable challenges in
reaching beyond their bases to appeal to the middle of the
electorate and build sustainable coalitions.78
This second report was based on analyses that used responses to
twenty-three questions about political attitudes and values to cluster
respondents into cohesive groups. It speciﬁcally addressed the
methodological differences with the earlier report:
[A] significant limitation of the ideological scale used in the
[first] polarization report is that it treats political ideology as a
single left-right scale. This approach is valuable in terms of
tracking levels of ideological consistency over time, but it does a
poor job of describing the political “center” other than that they
don’t hold consistently liberal or consistently conservative views.79
The result of the cluster analysis, reproduced in Table 1, is a
complex and nuanced picture in which a solid majority of voters (and a
sizeable plurality of the “politically engaged”) are what political scientists
term “cross-pressured80:” holding a mix of liberal and conservative views,
they are not well-represented by either party.81

/news/the-fix/wp/2015/01/07/the-1-chart-that-explains-everything-you-need-to-know-aboutpartisanship-in-america/ [http://perma.cc/YKK4-2UAF].
77. Pew Research Ctr., Beyond Red vs. Blue: The Political Typology—Fragmented Center
Poses Election Challenges for Both Parties (2014), http://www.people-press.org/files/2014
/06/6-26-14-Political-Typology-release1.pdf [http://perma.cc/Q87Z-3MLF] [hereinafter Pew,
Beyond Red vs. Blue].
78. Id. at 1.
79. Id. at 15.
80. E.g., D. Sunshine Hillygus & Todd G. Shields, The Persuadable Voter: Wedge Issues
in Presidential Campaigns 32–33 (2008) [hereinafter Hillygus & Shields, Persuadable Voter];
Morris P. Fiorina, Are Independents Truly “Closet Partisans”? Some Facts About Political
Independents, Centrist Project (Jan. 23, 2014), http://www.centristproject.org/fiorina
_independents [http://perma.cc/CM6P-BCS2] [hereinafter Fiorina, Closet Partisans].
81. See infra section III.B.3.b (describing political science views on extent to which most
of electorate is polarized); cf. Morris Fiorina, Americans Have Not Become More Politically
Polarized, Wash. Post: Monkey Cage (June 23, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/
monkey-cage/wp/2014/06/23/americans-have-not-become-more-politically-polarized/ [http://
perma.cc/FUB7-SGEN] [hereinafter Fiorina, Americans Not More Polarized] (describing
“unsorted and inconsistent middle . . . [that] has no home in either party”).
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TABLE 182

The bipolar framing of the two Pew reports parallels a vehement
political science debate about the nature and extent of polarization in
the electorate—a debate considered next.
B.

Polarization in the Electorate: The Political Science Debate

When it comes to assessing the existence and strength of polarization in the electorate, one of the few areas on which political scientists
agree is that the answer depends very much on the type of voter being
considered. In descending order of clear evidence of polarization, three
groups can be distinguished: activists, party identiﬁers, and everyone else.
1. Activists. — There is general agreement that party activists as a
group tend to be even more well-sorted by party and more ideologically
coherent and ideologically divergent than Congress itself.83 They are, in other
words, highly polarized.
82. Pew, Beyond Red vs. Blue, supra note 77, at 1.
83. See, e.g., Geoffrey C. Layman et al., Activists and Conflict Extension in American
Party Politics, 104 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 324, 330–34 (2010) (assessing polarization of national

19

2. Party Identiﬁers. — Citizens who self-identify as Republicans or
Democrats have become more ideologically coherent across the range of
social and economic issues and more well-sorted into the “appropriate”
party.84 Still, researchers have found that two-thirds of even strong
partisans disagree with their party on at least one issue they consider
personally important.85 An illustration drawn from the Pew cluster analysis
is the “Business Conservatives” cluster: individuals who predominantly
identify with the Republican Party and share the party’s pro-business, antiregulatory platform, but who tend to be pro-immigration and less aligned
with the party’s social conservatism on such issues as gay rights.86
With respect to ideological divergence, party identifiers have probably
moved further from the center, although this is far less well-established,87
and their divergence is certainly not as extreme as among party activists88
or legislators.89 There is a methodological problem here, in that measures
of citizens’ ideological consistency are often used to infer that Republicans
and Democrats “are further apart.”90 Questions used to index ideology
often present dichotomous choices, even though many people would not
place themselves 100% on one side or the other. For example, one Pew
ideological index question asked respondents to pick the “statement [that]
comes closer to your own views—even if neither is exactly right”: “The best
way to ensure peace is through military strength” (scored conservative) or
“Good diplomacy is the best way to ensure peace” (scored liberal).91 A
moderate Democrat who on balance preferred diplomacy but felt that
military strength was also important would answer the question in the
same way as a radical pacifist. Hence, over a set of ideologically consistent

party convention delegates since 1972). See generally supra notes 16–19 and accompanying
text (explaining the three strands of polarization).
84. See Barber & McCarty, Causes and Consequences, supra note 5, at 24; Geoffrey C.
Layman, Thomas M. Carsey & Juliana Menasce Horowitz, Party Polarization in American
Politics: Characteristics, Causes, and Consequences, 9 Ann. Rev. Pol. Sci. 83, 92–94 (2006).
85. Hillygus & Shields, Persuadable Voter, supra note 80, at 62; see also Jeremy C.
Pope, Voting vs. Thinking: Uniﬁed Partisan Voting Does Not Imply Uniﬁed Partisan
Beliefs, 10 Forum, no. 3, art. 5, 2012, at 8–10 (ﬁnding 30–40% of strong party affiliates and
approximately 50% of weak party affiliates disagree with party on at least one issue).
86. Pew, Beyond Red vs. Blue, supra note 77, at 19, 101.
87. See, e.g., Barber & McCarty, Causes and Consequences, supra note 5, at 25–26;
Hetherington, supra note 17, at 446.
88. See Layman et al., supra note 83, at 340–41; Layman, Carsey & Horowitz, supra
note 84, at 96–97.
89. See Joseph Bafumi & Michael C. Herron, Leapfrog Representation and
Extremism: A Study of American Voters and Their Members in Congress, 104 Am. Pol. Sci.
Rev. 519, 528–29 (2010); Joshua D. Clinton, Representation in Congress: Constituents and
Roll Calls in the 106th House, 68 J. Pol. 397, 406–07 (2006).
90. E.g., Carroll Doherty, Seven Things to Know About Polarization in America, Pew
Research Ctr.: FactTank (June 12, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014
/06/12/7-things-to-know-about-polarization-in-america/ [http://perma.cc/6Q42-FGYB].
91. Pew, Polarization in the Public, supra note 70, at 82, 103, 105–06.
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responses, this method tends to amplify the apparent distance between
Democratic and Republican respondents.92
Party identifiers do increasingly evidence cultural dimensions of
polarization. Compared to a generation ago, more now say that they have
negative feelings about members of the other party,93 would be
uncomfortable with their child marrying someone identified with the
opposite party,94 and prefer having friends from and living near those of
their own party.95 Republican-identifiers are somewhat more likely to express
these views than Democrat-identifiers.96
Party identifiers disproportionately affect electoral outcomes because
they are more likely to vote in primary and general elections as well as
contribute to and volunteer for political campaigns.97 Beyond agreeing on
this fact, however, political scientists passionately dispute the size and impact
of this group as compared to the rest of the electorate.98 Emblematic of one
camp is Alan Abramowitz, whose book The Disappearing Center: Engaged
Citizens, Polarization, and American Democracy argues that engaged and
polarized party identifiers are a large, important, and growing segment of
voters.99 Morris Fiorina, whose book Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized
America insists that ideologically coherent and divergent partisanship
remains the exception within the electorate, epitomizes the other camp.100

92. See David E. Broockman, Approaches to Studying Policy Representation, 40
Legis. Stud. Q. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 18–26) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law
Review); Fiorina, Americans Not More Polarized, supra note 81.
93. Pew, Polarization in the Public, supra note 70, at 32–33; Shanto Iyengar, Gaurav
Sood & Yphtach Lelkes, Affect Not Ideology: A Social Identity Perspective on Polarization,
76 Pub. Opinion Q. 405, 412–15, 420–21 (2012); see also Daron Shaw, If Everyone Votes
Their Party, Why Do Presidential Election Outcomes Vary So Much? 10 Forum, no. 3, art.
1, 2012, at 12 (discussing this animosity within electorate).
94. See Iyengar, Sood & Lelkes, supra note 93, at 415–18; see also Pew, Polarization in the
Public, supra note 70, at 48 (noting 15% of Democrats and 17% of Republicans feel this way).
95. See Pew, Polarization in the Public, supra note 70, at 42–44; see also Wendy K.
Tam Cho, James G. Gimpel & Iris S. Hui, Voter Migration and the Geographic Sorting of
the American Electorate, 103 Annals Ass’n Am. Geographers 856, 859–60, 866 (2013)
(ﬁnding partisans relocate based on racial composition, income, and population density
but also prefer areas populated with copartisans).
96. See Pew, Polarization in the Public, supra note 70, at 32–33, 44, 48; Iyengar, Sood
& Lelkes, supra note 93, at 418.
97. See Pew, Polarization in the Public, supra note 70, at 72–73; see also Abramowitz,
Disappearing Center, supra note 22, 86–89 (noting greater voter turnout among strong
partisans); supra Table 1 (showing greater political engagement among “partisan anchors”
than “less partisan” groups).
98. Hetherington, supra note 17, at 431.
99. Abramowitz, Disappearing Center, supra note 22, at 34–61, 169–72; accord Gary C.
Jacobson, Partisan Polarization in American Politics: A Background Paper, 43 Presidential
Stud. Q. 688, 691–700 (2013) [hereinafter Jacobson, Partisan Polarization].
100. Morris P. Fiorina et al., Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized America, at xiii, xv
(3d ed. 2010) [hereinafter Fiorina et al., Culture War?].
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3. Everyone Else (“The Center” or “The Middle”). — The state of
polarization among the rest of the electorate is difficult to assess and
highly disputed. Specific evidence is reviewed below, but the overall
picture appears to be as follows. Compared to activists and party
identifiers, most citizens are not particularly well sorted by partisan
identity101 and do not hold ideologically coherent views102—at least so long as
“coherence” is defined by reference to the conceptions of liberalism and
conservatism embodied in the current Democratic and Republican party
platforms.103 Instead, the common pattern is for individuals to hold a mix
of liberal and conservative preferences that makes neither party a good
ideological fit. In terms of ideological divergence, this large group is
sometimes called “the center” or “the middle”104—implying an ideological
location between the two party extremes—but it is probably incorrect to
attribute uniformly moderate preferences to this diverse range of
citizens.105 In general, this group is less politically engaged than the other
two groups although, as the Pew survey data show, it spans a huge range
from politically active to completely apathetic.106
a. Partisan Sorting. — With respect to partisan sorting, Table 2
summarizes the latest ANES data on how voting-eligible adults identify
their party affiliation.
TABLE 2: U.S. PARTY IDENTIFICATION 2012 107
Strong Democrat

20%

Weak Democrat

15%

Independent-leaning Democrat

12%

Pure Independent

14%

Independent-leaning Republican

12%

Weak Republican

12%

Strong Republican

15%

101. See infra section III.B.3.a.
102. See infra section III.B.3.b.
103. See infra section III.B.3.c.
104. E.g., Pew, Beyond Red vs. Blue, supra note 77, at 15; Morris P. Fiorina & Samuel
Abrams, Americans Are Not Polarized, Just Better Sorted, in Political Polarization in
American Politics, supra note 34, at 41, 42 [hereinafter Fiorina & Abrams, Americans Not
Polarized]; Andrew Kohut, The Political Middle Still Matters, Pew Research Ctr.: FactTank
(Aug. 1, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/08/01/the-political-middlestill-matters/ [http://perma.cc/ZM3S-R4YW].
105. See infra notes 130–133 and accompanying text.
106. See supra Table 1 (showing less political engagement among “less partisan”
groups than partisan groups).
107. Fiorina, Closet Partisans, supra note 80.
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In follow-up surveys, “strong” party identiﬁers virtually always remain
consistent in their declared party affiliation, and “weak” identiﬁers
overwhelmingly do so.108 The much-debated enigma is the 38% who selfidentify as pure and “leaning” Independents. The proportionate share of
these groups started to increase in the early 1970s.109 In recent Gallup
polling, a record 43% of respondents self-identiﬁed as Independent.110
Many political scientists are skeptical about Independents, especially
the leaners. According to the classic treatment, “[Leaners] are never
neutral, and the extent of their affect almost invariably resembles that of
weak partisans.”111 Scholars who perceive more polarization in the electorate
describe Independents (particularly leaners) as “closet partisans” who dislike
being labeled Republican or Democrat but consistently support only one
party’s candidate.112 Scholars who perceive less polarization in the electorate
counter that even leaners are more likely to support third-party candidates
and are less consistent in their self-reported partisan identification over
time.113 Indeed, Professor Fiorina argues that skepticism about
Independents rests on an unresolved methodological problem of cause and
effect: “[T]he tendency of leaning independents to vote for the party toward
which they lean may indicate that they use their voting intention to answer
the directional probe. That is, ‘I’m going to vote for Obama, so I guess I lean
to the Democrats.’”114
Whichever side has the better of this argument, polls consistently
show that the majority of Americans express an unfavorable view of both
the Republican and the Democratic parties.115 Indeed, as just noted, a
108. See id.
109. From 1972 to 2012, they totaled from 31% to 41% of voters; the subset of pure
independents ranged from 7% to 18%. Party Identiﬁcation 7-Point Scale (Revised in 2008)
1952–2008, Am. Nat’l Election Studies (Aug. 5, 2010), http://electionstudies.org
/nesguide/toptable/tab2a_1.htm [http://perma.cc/2UBY-UWW4].
110. Jeffrey M. Jones, In U.S., New Record 43% Are Political Independents, Gallup
(Jan. 7, 2015), http://www.gallup.com/poll/180440/new-record-political-independents
.aspx (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
111. Bruce E. Keith et al., The Myth of the Independent Voter 70 (1992) (emphasis
omitted).
112. E.g., Alan Abramowitz, The Partisans in the Closet: Political Independents Are
(Mostly) a Figment of Your Imagination, Politico (Jan. 8, 2014), http://www.politico.com
/magazine/story/2014/01/independent-voters-partisans-in-the-closet-101931.html#.VRv8LPzFs
[http://perma.cc/8MLY-CNR3]; John Sides, Three Myths About Political Independents, Wash.
Post: Monkey Cage (Dec. 17, 2009), http://themonkeycage.org/2009/12/17/
three_myths_about_political_in/ [http://perma.cc/ZR8B-NQLL].
113. E.g., Fiorina, Closet Partisans, supra note 80.
114. Alan A. Abramowitz & Morris P. Fiorina, Polarized or Sorted? Just What’s Wrong
with Our Politics Anyway?, Am. Int. (Mar. 11, 2013), http://www.the-americaninterest.com/2013/03/11/polarized-or-sorted-just-whats-wrong-with-our-politics-anyway/
[http://perma.cc/6LXM-9ZYC].
115. See, e.g., Fiorina & Abrams, Americans Not Polarized, supra note 104, at 44
(describing results of 2008 Comparative Study of Electoral Systems poll); Sarah Dutton et al.,
Americans’ Views of Obama, Congress, Political Parties: Gloomy, CBS News (Aug. 6, 2014, 6:30

23

key element of the skeptical view of Independents is the assumption that
these voters do not want to express affiliation with either party. This in
itself clearly distinguishes them from both activists and party identiﬁers,
for whom partisan affiliation is a strong component of identity that fuels
ideological coherence and divergence.116
b. Ideological Coherence. — To suggest that political opinions within the
electorate generally (mass opinion) are becoming consistently liberal or
conservative flouts a bedrock political science principle that most
Americans are “innocent of ‘ideology.’”117 Nevertheless, Professor
Abramowitz makes a variant of this argument in The Disappearing Center.
He theorizes that people become more politically engaged and ideologically consistent as they become better educated (even if many prefer to
self-identify as Independent).118 Hence, as education levels within the
electorate rise, so does the prevalence of voters with consistently liberal or
conservative views.119 Correlatively, he argues, people whose opinions
remain in the middle of the libera/conservative spectrum are disproportionately the politically uninformed and disengaged.120 The “center” is
disappearing, Professor Abramowitz believes, because it is increasingly
occupied by the least electorally relevant citizens.
Unsurprisingly, other scholars dispute this picture of growing
ideological coherence in mass opinion.121 Analyzing responses to ANES
policy questions over time, Jeremy Pope found that weak party identiﬁers
and leaners frequently defect from the party line in their issue

PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/americans-views-of-obama-congress-gloomy/ [http://perma
.cc/6DAW-22EM] (describing results of 2014 CBS poll); Frank Newport, Americans Less
Interested in Two Major Political Parties, Gallup (Jan. 12, 2015), http://www.gallup.com/
opinion/polling-matters/180917/americans-less-interested-two-major-political-parties.aspx
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing results of 2014 Gallup poll).
116. See generally Lilliana Mason, “I Disrespectfully Agree”: The Differential Effects
of Partisan Sorting on Social and Issue Polarization, 59 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 128, 141–42 (2015)
(ﬁnding individual’s identiﬁcation with party powerfully drives “political thought,
behavior, and emotion”).
117. Philip E. Converse, The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics, in Ideology and
Its Discontents (David E. Apter ed., 1964), reprinted in 18 Crit. Rev. 1, 47 (2006).
118. See Abramowitz, Disappearing Center, supra note 22, at 120–27; see also Alan
Abramowitz, The Polarized Public?: Why American Government Is So Dysfunctional, at xi–
xii (2012) (rejecting argument voters are “innocent victims” because “fundamental fact
underlying the deep partisan divide in Washington” is that “rank-and-ﬁle Democrats and
Republicans are themselves deeply divided”).
119. See Abramowitz, Disappearing Center, supra note 22, at 120–27.
120. See id. at x; cf. Broockman, supra note 92 (manuscript at 23–26) (using different
analytical method to show greater ideological coherence of more educated and engaged
voters does not mean their opinions are more extreme).
121. See, e.g., Barber & McCarty, Causes and Consequences, supra note 5, at 23–26
(concluding most voters do not share extreme policy positions); Hetherington, supra note
17, at 422, 431, 446–48 (same); Seth J. Hill & Chris Tausanovitch, A Disconnect in
Representation? Comparison of Trends in Congressional and Public Polarization, 77 J. Pol.
1058, 1067–69 (2015) (same).
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positions.122 He concludes, “[T]here is nothing wrong with the idea that
leaners often look very much like the weak partisans in their attitudes.
The problem is that the parties in the electorate do not have nearly the
policy coherence necessary to think of them as uniﬁed camps.”123 This
conclusion aligns with survey reports that a substantial proportion of
Americans believe neither major party well represents their views.124
c. Ideological Divergence. — Perhaps the most interesting part of the
debate about polarization in the electorate is whether citizens in the
large, amorphous “middle” in fact generally hold moderate, centrist
views or, instead, are becoming more extreme in their issue positions. To
some degree, disagreement on this point reﬂects differing characterizations of the same evidence.125 More fundamentally, the methodological problem of using measures of coherence to infer divergence
reappears here. The previous discussion pointed out how cumulating
dichotomous answers in order to construct liberal/conservative ideology
scales will overstate the apparent extremism of ideologically consistent
respondents.126 The reverse effect—masking extremism as apparent
moderation—occurs when ideologically inconsistent answers (as judged by
prevailing liberal/conservative ideological conceptions) are averaged.
For example, a right-wing populist who selects the Republican answer on
immigration because he believes in deporting all illegal immigrants and
the Democratic answer on business regulation because he distrusts Wall
Street will fall in the center of the distribution—as will a committed
libertarian who chooses the Republican answer on business regulation
and the Democratic answer on abortion because she believes government should stay out of both areas.127
122. Pope, supra note 85, at 6–8.
123. Id. at 3; see also Hillygus & Shields, Persuadable Voter, supra note 80, at 59–68
(presenting data on party identiﬁers disagreeing with issues in party platform); Delia
Baldassarri & Andrew Gelman, Partisans Without Constraint: Political Polarization and
Trends in American Public Opinion, 114 Am. J. Soc. 408, 441, 443 (2008) (same).
124. See Fiorina & Abrams, Americans Not Polarized, supra note 104, at 44; Jeffrey M.
Jones, In U.S., Perceived Need for Third Party Reaches New High, Gallup (Oct. 11, 2013),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/165392/perceived-need-third-party-reaches-new-high.aspx
(on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
125. See Hill & Tausanovitch, supra note 121, at 1059 (acknowledging results may
depend on choice of survey question); cf. Todd Eberly, The Difference Between
Polarization and Party Sorting, Free Stater Blog (Jan. 30, 2014, 12:04 PM),
http://freestaterblog.blogspot.
com/2014/01/the-difference-between-polarization-and.html [http://perma.cc/N9XZ-PM
H4] (showing how data about public opinion on abortion over time can be interpreted as
either increasingly divergent or not).
126. See supra notes 90–92 and accompanying text.
127. Fiorina, Americans Not More Polarized, supra note 81. Conceptual chauvinism is
embedded in the way “ideological coherence” is deployed in this area. As these examples
suggest, there are coherent political philosophies that transcend the liberal/conservative
boundaries defined by current party platforms. Libertarianism is probably the most thoroughly
conceptualized, but it is not the only one. Moreover, the issue positions that characterize various
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Using methods deliberately designed to measure divergence, Hill
and Tausanovitch conclude that “Americans tend to be no more distant
from one another today than they were in the 1950s,” even on social
issues often thought to be driving polarization.128 This is not the same as
saying that the middle is “a mass of principled centrists.”129 In The
Persuadable Voter, Hillygus and Shields ﬁnd that the electorate “is not
simply moderate across policy issues; it holds heterogeneous policy
preferences” that candidates can use to build winning coalitions.130
Moreover, heterogeneity is not the same as chaos. Voters “do often hold
true and meaningful policy preferences”131—even if prevailing
liberal/conservative conceptions cannot predict what those preferences
will be.132 Consider, for example, the four clusters of citizens, revealed in
the Pew analysis, who are not party-identiﬁers:133
 “Faith and Family Left”: Predominantly non-white and older, they
“support activist government and a strong social safety net,” but their
deep religious convictions diverge from the Democratic party line on
social issues like same sex marriage. Roughly half hold an equal mix of
liberal and conservative values.134
 “Hard-Pressed Skeptics”: Battered by the economic downturn and
the poorest of any group, they deeply resent both government and
business. Although critical of government performance, they strongly
support increased social spending but hold more conservative views on
issues such as homosexuality and are less likely to approve of the
Affordable Care Act. Two-thirds express an equal number of liberal and
conservative positions.135
 “Young Outsiders”: Younger and more ethnically diverse than
Republicans, they share a deep opposition to increased government
spending on social programs but tend to be liberal on social issues such
as homosexuality, secular in religious orientation, and generally open to

clusters of mass opinion in the Pew analysis (discussed next) have a discernible rationality, even
if they do not map onto a fully conceptualized political philosophy.
128. Hill & Tausanovitch, supra note 121, at 17.
129. Fiorina, Closet Partisans, supra note 80.
130. Hillygus & Shields, Persuadable Voter, supra note 80, at 79; see also Douglas J. Ahler &
David E. Broockman, Does Polarization Imply Poor Representation? A New Perspective on the
“Disconnect” Between Politicians and Voters 26–29 (July 26, 2015) (unpublished manuscript),
http://stanford.edu/~dbroock/papers/ahler_broockman_ideological_innocence.pdf
[http://perma.cc/2SSV-WKCZ] (ﬁnding some of these issue preferences more extreme
than positions of either party).
131. Hillygus & Shields, Persuadable Voter, supra note 80, at 52.
132. See Broockman, supra note 92 (manuscript at 11–15).
133. See supra Table 1.
134. Pew, Beyond Red vs. Blue, supra note 77, at 2, 8–9, 17, 109–10.
135. Id. at 2, 10–11, 18, 105–06.
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immigration. Seventy percent take an equal mix of liberal and conservative positions.136
 “Next Generation Left”: The other principal cluster of young
voters, they have liberal views on social issues, but are more positive
about Wall Street and wary of the social safety net because of its costs.
Just over 40% take an equal number of liberal and conservative
positions.137
All these clusters are heavily cross-pressured, comprising voters who
“genuinely support[] liberal policies in some domains and conservative
policies in others,”138 although the nature and direction of the pressures
are quite different for each cluster. Together, they total 57% of registered
voters and more than 40% of “politically engaged” citizens139—giving rise
to the subtitle of the Pew report, Fragmented Center Poses Election Challenges
for Both Parties.
Finally, the diverse and fragmented middle does not exhibit the
cultural polarization of strong party-identiﬁers. Overall, substantially
more people say they prefer elected officials who make compromises to
those “who stick to their positions.”140 The pro-compromise position is
even stronger in younger subgroups.141 Finally, the overwhelming majority report little concern about living where most people share their
political views, having family members marry within their party, or having
most of their close friends share their political views.142
C.

The Bottom Line

Congressional polarization is not mirrored by polarization in the
electorate generally. Most citizens appear to hold a mix of liberal and
conservative preferences. This cross-pressured state is reﬂected in polls
expressing a negative opinion of both parties and a belief that neither
party well-represents their views. More evidence of polarization appears
in subgroups of the electorate whose inﬂuence on the political process is
disproportionate to their numbers. In particular, activists are at least as
polarized as Congress. Those who strongly self-identify with one or the
other party have more characteristics of polarization than the majority of
citizens, and there are signs that this subgroup is becoming more

136. Id. at 2, 10–11, 18–19, 103–04.
137. Id. at 2, 8–9, 17–18, 107–08.
138. Broockman, supra note 92, at 15.
139. See supra Table 1.
140. Pew, Beyond Red vs. Blue, supra note 77, at 24.
141. See id. (ﬁnding 71% of Next Generation Left and 57% of Young Outsiders prefer
compromise).
142. See Pew, Polarization in the Public, supra note 70, at 98, 109–10, 123 (ﬁnding
over 70% of respondents say living among people with shared political views and having
family members marry within political party is unimportant and only 35% claim most close
friends share their political views).
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polarized. Still, even most partisans disagree with their party on at least
one issue of importance to them.
IV. OTHER POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS
“[M]ore than most people we realize how little we genuinely know about the
operation of complex political processes and institutions, and, consequently, how
likely it is that proposed reforms will prove ineffectual or, worse, counterproductive.”
~Fiorina, Abrams & Pope 143
Because the most obvious explanatory hypothesis for congressional
polarization—legislators are simply representing the highly polarized
preferences of their constituency—is not supported by the evidence,
other kinds of explanations have been proffered. Many of these are
plausible hypotheses, but the actual evidential support is slim,
particularly given how fundamental and controversial the accompanying
remedial proposals tend to be. Moreover, some of the most vigorously
argued explanations, and associated proposed cures, are in direct
conﬂict. At least so far, no smoking gun has been discovered that
convincingly accounts for rising congressional polarization in recent
decades or supports the prediction that legislative gridlock is likely to be
intractably entrenched.
A.

Explanations Focused on Distortion of Electoral Outcomes

If current levels of congressional polarization do not reﬂect
preferences of the electorate, a logical hypothesis is that some aspect of
the electoral process is producing unrepresentative representatives.
Gerrymandering, use of primaries for candidate selection, and campaign
ﬁnancing are the prime targets of attention and proposed reform.
Gerrymandering is a venerable American tradition.144 Although it is
conceivable that today’s state legislatures are just more adept at partisan
manipulation than all their predecessors, the more plausible account
focuses on technological advances: New methods of gathering and
analyzing information now enable highly accurate micro-mapping of
residential patterns that makes partisan line-drawing far more effective.145
Still, researchers generally reject the gerrymandering explanation.146 For
one thing, partisan redistricting cannot explain polarization in the
143. Fiorina et al., Culture War?, supra note 100, at 209.
144. “Gerrymander” is derived from Elbridge Gerry (Madison’s Vice President) and
salamander (the shape of an electoral district he created while Governor of Massachusetts).
Kenneth C. Martis, The Original Gerrymander, 27 Pol. Geography 833, 833–35 (2008).
145. See William A. Galston & Pietro S. Nivola, Delineating the Problem, in Red and
Blue Nation? Characteristics and Causes of American’s Polarized Politics: Volume One
1,supra note 5, at 25.
146. See, e.g., Barber & McCarty, Causes and Consequences, supra note 5, at 27–28;
Gary C. Jacobson, Eroding the Electoral Foundations of Partisan Polarization, in Solutions
to Political Polarization in America, supra note 16, at 83, 86.
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Senate147 or in House delegations from low-population states with a
single, at-large district.148 Moreover, representatives from competitive
districts (that is, districts with a mix of registered Republicans and
Democrats) do not have more moderate roll-call voting records than
those from extremely partisan districts.149 Finally, simulations of expected
partisanship of representatives from randomly generated districts
produce results almost as polarized as the actual Congress.150
Even more disconcerting than the research that fails to support the
gerrymandering hypothesis are recent studies ﬁnding that legislators
from districts with a heterogeneous mix of Republican and Democratic
voters tend to have more extreme roll-call voting records than those from
homogenous districts.151 One proposed explanation is that heterogeneity
creates greater electoral uncertainty, which allows more extreme
candidates to pursue policy goals that diverge from median voter
preferences in pursuit of the support of more engaged and ideological
voters.152 Whether or not this explanation is accurate, the evidence
suggests that districting reform in the direction of creating more
competitive districts could actually do more harm than good.153
The second area of focus, primaries, rests on the observation that
primary turnout is reliably lower than turnout in the general election
and the standard wisdom that this exaggerates the voice of activists and
strong partisans who favor more extreme candidates than the median
voter would prefer.154 The commonly used closed primary—in which
voting is limited to registered party members—is a relatively recent
method of selecting who will represent the party in the general
election.155 Hence, some reformers propose moving to open or top-two
primaries in order to expand the pool of voters who select
147. See Bafumi & Herron, supra note 89, at 529–30. Since the enactment of the
Seventeenth Amendment in 1913, both senators from each state are directly elected at
large. U.S. Const. amend. XVII.
148. Nolan McCarty, Reducing Polarization: Some Facts for Reformers, U. Chi. Legal
Forum (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 3) [hereinafter McCarty, Reducing Polarization]
(on file with the Columbia Law Review). Currently, seven states—Alaska, Delaware, Montana,
North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming—have a single representative. Directory
of Representatives, U.S. House of Representatives, http://www.house.gov/representatives/
[http://perma.cc/RQ5Y-T9HS] (last visited Aug. 12, 2015).
149. See Barber & McCarty, Causes and Consequences, supra note 5, at 27–28;
McCarty, Reducing Polarization, supra note 148 (manuscript at 14–26).
150. See Nolan McCarty, Keith T. Poole, & Howard Rosenthal, Does Gerrymandering
Cause Polarization?, 53 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 666, 674–75, 679 (2009).
151. See McCarty, Reducing Polarization, supra note 148 (manuscript at 22–26)
(collecting studies).
152. Id.
153. See id. at 25.
154. See David W. Brady, Hahrie Han & Jeremy C. Pope, Primary Elections and Candidate
Ideology: Out of Step with the Primary Electorate?, 32 Legis. Stud. Q. 79, 84–92, 98–99 (2007).
155. See infra section IV.B (discussing history of parties’ role in campaigns).
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candidates156—or even abolishing primaries altogether in favor of
ranked-voting, instant runoff elections.157 Some studies do link open
primaries with more moderate candidates,158 but recent empirical work
ﬁnds little effect on legislative polarization from the type of primary.159
Mandatory voting is a more extreme proposal for expanding the group
of voters who select representatives.160 Formal modeling provides some
support for thinking that substantially increased turnout would shift
candidate positions toward the median voter,161 but many commenters warn
of the unpredictable, and possibly unintended, consequences of so fundamental a change in American elections162—a concern that is hardly fanciful
in light of recent findings on the surprisingly counterproductive results,

156. See, e.g., Mann & Ornstein, Even Worse than It Looks, supra note 63, at 147–49.
Open primaries allow any registered voter to vote in any one party-specific primary. Top-two
primaries involve all candidates of all parties with the top two vote getters, regardless of party,
moving on to the general election. Congressional and Presidential Primaries: Open, Closed,
Semi-Closed and “Top Two,” Ctr. for Voting & Democracy, http://www.fairvote.org/researchand-analysis/presidential-elections/congressional-and-presidential-primaries-open-closedsemi-closed-and-top-two/ [http://perma.cc/AE5S-2A9T] (last updated July 2015).
157. See, e.g., Mann & Ornstein, Even Worse than It Looks, supra note 63, at 149–52;
Arend Lijphart, Polarization and Democratization, in Solutions to Political Polarization in
America, supra note 16, at 73, 74–75. In instant runoff systems, voters rank all candidates in
order of preference; votes are tabulated using preference rankings to simulate a series of
runoffs. How Instant Runoff Voting Works, Ctr. for Voting & Democracy, http://
www.fairvote.org/reforms/instant-runoff-voting/how-instant-runoff-voting-works/ [http://
perma.cc/UDU4-3TDE] (last visited Aug. 12, 2015).
158. See, e.g., Elisabeth R. Gerber & Rebecca B. Morton, Primary Election Systems and
Representation, 14 J.L. Econ. & Org. 304, 321 (1998) (comparing extremeness of legislators
elected through open versus closed primaries, based on ideology ranking of Americans for
Democratic Action); Karen M. Kaufmann, James G. Gimpel & Adam H. Hoffman, A Promise
Fulfilled? Open Primaries and Representation, 65 J. Pol. 457, 471 (2003) (comparing characteristics of open versus closed primary voters vis-à-vis characteristics of general election voters).
159. See McCarty, Reducing Polarization, supra note 148 (manuscript at 3–4); Eric
McGhee et al., A Primary Cause of Partisanship? Nomination Systems and Legislator
Ideology, 58 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 337, 338–39 (2014).
160. See, e.g., Mann & Ornstein, Even Worse than It Looks, supra note 63, at 140–43;
Lijphart, supra note 157, at 78–79.
161. See, e.g., Justin Mattias Valasek, Get Out the Vote: How Encouraging Voting
Changes Political Outcomes, 24 Econ. & Pol. 346, 360 (2012); cf. Steven Callander &
Catherine H. Wilson, Turnout, Polarization, and Duverger’s Law, 69 J. Pol. 1047, 1055
(2007) (discussing correlation between reduced turnout and increased polarization).
162. See, e.g., Jason Brennan & Lisa Hill, Compulsory Voting: For and Against 83–107
(2014); John Sides, Even More on the Potential Impact of Mandatory Voting, Wash. Post:
Monkey Cage (Mar. 25, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp
/2015/03/25/even-more-on-the-potential-impact-of-mandatory-voting/ [http://perma.cc
/NE55-PBT7]; see also Shane P. Singh, Compulsory Voting and Dissatisfaction with
Democracy 3 (Mar. 11, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2429002 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (ﬁnding, based
on evidence from Latin American countries, mandatory voting increases dissatisfaction
and encourages citizens experiencing alienation to question political legitimacy).
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discussed above, of creating heterogeneous congressional districts163 or of
implementing some popular campaign finance reforms, discussed next.164
The third focus, campaign financing, is a plausible contributor to
polarization because it also has changed over time.165 However, the
empirical evidence here actually contradicts some of the most advocated
reform proposals. For example, it appears that partial public funding can
actually increase polarization, apparently by disproportionately decreasing
contributions from “access-oriented” interest groups.166 These are groups,
predominantly industry and trade associations, who care about access to
whomever holds the office, in contrast to issue-oriented groups, who care
about supporting candidates aligned with the group’s substantive
preferences or ideology.167 Because access-oriented groups seek to invest in
longevity in office, they tend to support incumbents over challengers, and
more moderate over more extreme candidates.168 Full public funding
removes this effect, but so far has not reduced polarization in the states
that have implemented it.169
With respect to private funding, researchers have not found that
corporate political action committees (PACs) drive polarization; such
donors tend to be access-oriented rather than ideologically oriented and to
hedge their bets by spreading funding around.170 Individual donors, by
contrast, are generally more ideological than both PACs and the median
voter; moreover, they tend to be less concerned with a candidate’s
electability.171 Recent research on state legislators suggests that the most
widely advocated campaign financing reform—restricting PAC contri-

163. See supra notes 151–153 and accompanying text.
164. See infra notes 166–172 and accompanying text.
165. See infra section IV.B (discussing history of parties’ role in campaigns).
166. See Andrew B. Hall, How the Public Funding of Elections Increases Candidate
Polarization, Ctr. for Competitive Pol. 22–23 (2014), http://www.campaignfreedom.org
/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Hall-2014-Tax-Financing-And-Polarization.pdf
[http://perma.cc/KJ3U-M8MX] (analyzing data from Connecticut before and after
public funding).
167. See Alexander Fouirnaies & Andrew B. Hall, The Financial Incumbency
Advantage: Causes and Consequences, 76 J. Pol. 711, 717 (2014).
168. Hall, supra note 166, at 23–24. Recall the polarization evidence that new
members replacing incumbents account for more movement to the extremes than existing
members shifting their positions. See supra section I.B.
169. See Seth E. Masket & Michael G. Miller, Does Public Election Funding Create More
Extreme Legislators? Evidence from Arizona and Maine, 15 St. Pol. & Pol’y Q. 24, 25 (2015).
170. See Michael Barber, Ideological Donors, Contribution Limits, and the Polarization
of American Legislatures 2 (Jan. 30, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), https://static1
.squarespace.com/static/51841c73e4b04fc5ce6e8f15/t/54d24adae4b092c13f8d35c6/142306
7866936/Limits_Revised.pdf [https://perma.cc/D4BJ-XT42] (collecting literature); see also
Adam Bonica, Ideology and Interests in the Political Marketplace, 57 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 294, 308
(2013) (quantifying average loss of PAC contributions as candidate moves from centrist
positions to either ideological extreme).
171. Barber, supra note 170, at 6.
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butions while encouraging individual contributions—can actually increase
legislative polarization.172
In sum, although electoral-process reforms are widely advocated as
remedies, there is little hard evidence that gerrymandering, primaries, or
existing campaign ﬁnancing practices are the causal agents driving
contemporary congressional polarization. This is probably good news,
given the formidable legal and institutional obstacles to large-scale
national reform in these areas.
B.

Explanations Focused on Party Power and Control

Another set of proposed explanations for congressional polarization
focuses on the parties. However, these explanations run in opposite
directions: Some researchers insist that polarization has increased
because the parties are too weak (pro-party theorists), while others as
vehemently identify the problem as too much party power and control
(anti-party theorists).
In Anthony Downs’s classic model of party behavior, parties have
strong incentives to converge to the median voter.173 A small group of
scholars has recently argued that the Republican and Democratic parties
have become too weak to function as Downsian parties.174 Historically,
candidate selection was controlled by local party organizations that were
hierarchical, long-standing, and largely autonomous from outside
interests: They set platforms, ran campaigns, allocated patronage and
other resources, and turned out voters.175 Over the course of the
twentieth century, a series of changes “democratized” party decisionmaking.176 In this transformation, the argument goes, power shifted from
party leaders who could screen out extremist candidates to ideologically
driven “outsiders” who fuel polarized politics.177 Pro-party theorists point
to evidence that states with a history of strong traditional party organ-

172. See id. at 28–29.
173. See Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy 115–17 (1957).
174. Nolan McCarty, Reducing Polarization by Making Parties Stronger, in Solutions to
Political Polarization in America, supra note 16, at 136 [hereinafter McCarty, Making
Parties Stronger]; Nathaniel Persily, Stronger Parties as a Solution to Polarization, in
Solutions to Political Polarization in America, supra note 16, at 123 [hereinafter Persily,
Stronger Parties]; Richard H. Pildes, Focus on Political Fragmentation, Not Polarization,
in Solutions to Political Polarization in America, supra note 16, at 146 [hereinafter Pildes,
Political Fragmentation].
175. See David Mayhew, Placing Parties in American Politics 19–20, 203–37 (1986)
[hereinafter Mayhew, Placing Parties].
176. See id. at 308–32 (describing “detailed regulation of internal party processes” and
“independent legislators”); Persily, Stronger Parties, supra note 174, at 124 (giving examples
of increased use of primaries and opening up participation in nominating conventions).
177. See, e.g., McCarty, Making Parties Stronger, supra note 174, at 137–38; Richard H.
Pildes, Romanticizing Democracy, Political Fragmentation, and the Decline of American
Government, 124 Yale L.J. 804, 828–30 (2014).
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izations have less polarized legislatures than weak-party states.178 They
therefore advocate strengthening party leadership through: campaign
ﬁnance reform that shifts public and private money from individual
candidates to parties;179 abolishing primaries in favor of candidate
selection by the party,180 or at least enhancing the role of parties in
primaries through such measures as vetting who can use the party label
on the ballot or allowing an official party ballot endorsement;181 moving
to party-based proportional representation for legislative districts;182 and
reviving tools of leadership leverage such as earmarks.183
Many of these pro-party proposals run directly contrary to the
“conventional” set of electoral process reforms discussed above,184 and proparty advocates defend their approach in part by pointing to the lack of
evidence that the conventionally advocated reforms will actually lower
polarization.185 However, there is equally little empirical basis for
predicting that pro-party proposals would have the desired effect. What
can be said is that they would reverse the direction of twentieth-century
political reforms. During the previous polarization highpoint, from 1890
to 1910, political machines and other species of traditional party organization flourished,186 and leadership in the House was consolidated under
Speakers legendary for their iron control over the agenda and the
Members.187 Progressive reformers championed systems of direct election,
leading to widespread state adoption of party primaries in the first decades

178. E.g., McCarty, Making Parties Stronger, supra note 174, at 140–43.
179. E.g., id. at 144; Pildes, Political Fragmentation, supra note 174, at 152–54.
180. E.g., Persily, Stronger Parties, supra note 174, at 128–29.
181. E.g., McCarty, Making Parties Stronger, supra note 174, at 143–44; Persily,
Stronger Parties, supra note 174, at 129–30.
182. E.g., Persily, Stronger Parties, supra note 174, at 130–31.
183. E.g., Pildes, Political Fragmentation, supra note 174, at 154–55.
184. See supra section IV.A.
185. See, e.g., Persily, Stronger Parties, supra note 174, at 124–25.
186. See Jamie L. Carson, Erik J. Engstrom & Jason M. Roberts, Candidate Quality, the
Personal Vote, and the Incumbency Advantage in Congress, 101 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 289, 291
(2007).
187. See David W. Brady & Phillip Althoff, Party Voting in the U.S. House of
Representatives, 1890–1910: Elements of a Responsible Party System, 36 J. Pol. 753, 760–64
(1974); see also Thomas E. Mann & Norman J. Ornstein, The Broken Branch: How Congress
Is Failing America and How to Get It Back on Track 7 (2006) [hereinafter Mann & Ornstein,
Broken Branch] (noting similarities between recent congressional behavior and late
nineteenth-century Gilded Age); Brady & Han, Then and Now, supra note 11, at 131 (noting
strength of “party cohesion” in 1890 to 1910 period such that “level of party voting was
relatively high and party discipline was high even on bipartisan votes”). Speakers Thomas
Brackett Reed and Joseph Cannon presided over the House for much of this period. See
Hetherington, supra note 17, at 427. Cannon, in particular, wielded dictatorial control over
agenda and committee assignments, and accounts of congressional history frequently use the
word “revolt” to describe the changes eventually forced by members to reduce the power of
Cannon and subsequent speakers. See, e.g., Christopher J. Deering & Steven S. Smith,
Committees in Congress 30 (3d ed. 1997).
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of the twentieth century188 and passage of the Seventeenth Amendment in
1913. Democratization occurred within Congress as well, when Member
revolt replaced centralized majority-party control with committee government rooted in seniority189—a development some research suggests
contributed to reversing the polarization of the 1890 to 1910 period.190
The pro-party view stands in sharp contrast to the more common view
that congressional polarization has been fueled by too much party power.
The historic Republican takeover of Congress in the November 1994
midterm elections was followed by changes in organization and procedure
that once again strengthened the leadership’s control—particularly in the
House, where polarization is most acute.191 These changes enable the
leadership to use agenda control to minimize defections, refuse to allow
bills with bipartisan support to come to the floor, and restrict amendments
that might moderate proposed legislation.192 The increasing practice of
bundling bills into omnibus legislation also minimizes Members’ ability to
support the leadership on some issues and not others.193 The combination
of agenda manipulation and Member discipline produces a roll-call voting
record that amplifies partisan differences.194
Anti-party proponents support the conventional electoral process
reforms195 that reduce party inﬂuence in districting and candidate
188. See Robert G. Boatright, Congressional Primary Elections 30–31 (2014); Mayhew,
Placing Parties, supra note 175, at 224–25, 308–12.
189. See Deering & Smith, supra note 187, at 26–30; Jeffrey A. Jenkins & Nathan W.
Monroe, Negative Agenda Control and the Conservative Coalition in the U.S. House, 76 J.
Pol. 1116, 1117 (2014).
190. E.g., Hetherington, supra note 17, at 427; see also Brady & Althoff, supra note 187, at
774 (observing that during 1890 to 1910 period, Congress centralized leadership and
empowered it “to prevent obstructionist tactics of the minority”); Sara Chatfield, Jeffrey A.
Jenkins & Charles Stewart III, Polarization Lost: Exploring the Decline of Ideological Voting
After the Gilded Age 22–25, 29 (2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://faculty.virginia.edu/
jajenkins/pol_lost.pdf [http://perma.cc/8BZR-D3SB] (suggesting loss of agenda control over
floor by party leadership contributed to decline of polarization after 1890 to 1910 period).
191. See Deering & Smith, supra note 187, at 48–52; Hetherington, supra note 17, at
424–25, 427; cf. Russell Muirhead, Finding the Center, in Solutions to Political Polarization
in America, supra note 16, at 230, 233–34 (Nathaniel Persily ed., 2015) (arguing House
leadership’s power to prevent ﬂoor votes on bills that would split majority caucus has
obscured presence of “latent majority” of Democratic members plus minority of
Republican Members).
192. See Harbridge, Is Bipartisanship Dead?, supra note 40, at 54–55, 62–73; Mann &
Ornstein, Even Worse than It Looks, supra note 63, at 7–9, 171–72; Joshua Huder, 113th
Congress: Arguably the Least Democratic in American History, Rule 22 (Nov. 22, 2014),
https://rule22.wordpress.com/2014/11/20/113th-congress-arguably-the-least-democraticin-american-history/ [http://perma.cc/7VF7-2FXZ]; see also Barber & McCarty, Causes
and Consequences, supra note 5, at 34 (reviewing anti-party arguments).
193. Mann & Ornstein, Broken Branch, supra note 187, at 173–74; Hetherington,
supra note 17, at 425.
194. See Sean Theriault, Party Polarization in Congress 156–70 (2008); Hetherington,
supra note 17, at 424–25.
195. See supra section IV.A.
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selection.196 To directly address behavior within Congress, they advocate
changes in organization and procedure—such as modiﬁcation of Senate
ﬁlibuster rules or bipartisan election of the Speaker of the House197—
that would concededly require considerable Member self-discipline.
More broadly, anti-party proponents argue for both intra-party and
external public pressure to change what is perceived to be a toxic party
culture198—an issue considered in the next subsection.
In the end, these two diametrically opposed theories epitomize the
difficulty of diagnosing the causes of such a complex phenomenon as
congressional polarization and prescribing a cure that will reliably make
things better rather than worse. Strong-party theorists rely heavily on the
Downsian model to predict that party leaders, given enough power, will
pull their parties and their parties’ congressional caucuses back from the
extremes. To be sure, leadership power can be exercised to facilitate
action by what Russell Muirhead has called the “latent majority” in
Congress.199 This recently occurred when House Speaker John Boehner
publicly (and controversially) disciplined ultra-conservative members of
his own party for procedural maneuverings that would have derailed the
bipartisan deal on fast-track authority in the Trans-Paciﬁc Partnership
negotiations.200 But anti-party theorists have many counterexamples, and
so far there has been no effort at rigorous empirical analysis of the extent
and impact of strong party leadership behaviors.201 Also on the anti-party
side is the historical observation that the 1890 to 1910 period of high
polarization was a highpoint of leadership dominance.

196. See, e.g., Mann & Ornstein, Even Worse than It Looks, supra note 63, at 143–59
(arguing for campaign finance, redistricting, and primary reform); Steven S. Smith, Partisan
Polarization and the Senate Syndrome, in Solutions to Political Polarization in America,
supra note 16, at 218, 227–28 (advocating for primary reform and instant-runoff voting).
197. See, e.g., Mann & Ornstein, Even Worse than It Looks, supra note 63, at 166–72;
Muirhead, supra note 191, at 235–36; Smith, supra note 196, at 225–27.
198. See, e.g., Mann & Ornstein, Even Worse than It Looks, supra note 63, at 184–91.
199. Muirhead, supra note 191, at 233–35; see also supra note 40 and accompanying
text (describing Laurel Harbridge’s empirically based ﬁnding of “latent but remarkably
persistent” bipartisanship in the House).
200. See Emma Dumain & Matt Fuller, Conservatives Fume over Leadership’s Crackdown
on Rebels, Roll Call 218 (June 22, 2015), http://blogs.rollcall.com/218/conservatives-fumeover-gop-retribution/?dcz= [http://perma.cc/TCN2-PUZT]; Matt Fuller, Rule Vote Retribution
Continues; Chaffetz Takes Away Subcommittee Gavel, Roll Call 218 (June 20, 2015), http://
blogs.rollcall.com/218/rule-vote-retribution-continues-chaffetz-takes-away-subcommittee-gavel/
[http://perma.cc/T4B7-Z8XZ]; Sophia Tesfaye, Boehner Exacts His Revenge: TPP Opponents
Get Sacked in House GOP Leadership Purge, Salon (June 16, 2015, 6:07 PM), http://
www.salon.com/2015/06/16/boehner_exacts_his_revenge_tpp_opponents_get_sacked_in_house
_gop_leadership_purge/ [http://perma.cc/3JMN-MYNZ].
201. Some pro-party theorists themselves acknowledge that the party-empowerment
strategy carries the risk that the party will be captured by extremists. E.g., Persily, Stronger
Parties, supra note 174, at 132.
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C.

Explanations Focused on Party Culture and Responses to Electoral Parity

A third group of explanations also emphasizes the parties but instead of
focusing on the degree of power and control exercised by party leadership,
these explanations try to account directly for the rise in conflictual,
hyperpartisan behavior by leaders and members alike. One of these
explanations concentrates specifically on Republican Party culture because
roll-call measures of congressional polarization show Republican members
asymmetrically moving further toward the extremes than congressional
Democrats.202 The other explanation implicates the behavior of both parties
by focusing on the close electoral margins that produce rapid fluctuations in
party control of the House, the Senate, and the presidency.
Given the observation of asymmetry, it makes sense to ask why
Republicans disproportionately would engage in partisan gridlockcausing behavior. In the late 1990s, Richard Fenno argued that
Republicans, who gained control of Congress in the 1994 midterm
elections after forty years as the minority party in the House, needed to
learn how to govern within a Madisonian institution.203 After two government shutdowns that voters largely blamed on them, Speaker Newt
Gingrich realized the need for compromise, and the House worked with
President Clinton to produce major legislation on welfare reform,
balancing the budget, and lowering taxes.204 More recently, some researchers have argued that newer Republican legislators, particularly
senators who postdate the Gingrich era, must learn these lessons again.205
A darker assessment sees the Republican Party as deliberately positioning
itself as an “insurgent outlier in American politics.”206 Openly scornful of
opposition positions and often vituperative about opponents,
congressional Republicans do not follow what one longtime Republican
staffer terms the “unwritten rules, customs and courtesies that lubricate
the legislative machinery and keep governance a relatively civilized pro-

202. See supra section I.A.
203. See Richard F. Fenno, Jr., Learning To Govern: An Institutional View of the 104th
Congress 19–36 (1997).
204. See id. at 37–51; William F. Connelly, Jr. & John J. Pitney, Jr., The House
Republicans: Lessons for Political Science, in New Majority or Old Minority? The Impact
of Republicans on Congress 173, 186–89 (Nicol C. Rae & Colton C. Campbell eds., 1999).
205. See, e.g., Learning to Govern . . . Again?, Cong. & the Politics of Problem Solving
(Dec.
14,
2013),
https://congressandthepoliticsofproblemsolving.wordpress.com
/2013/12/14/learning-to-governagain/ [https://perma.cc/W7HZ-8XQQ].
206. Mann & Ornstein, Even Worse than It Looks, supra note 63, at 185; cf. Ronald M.
Peters, Jr., Institutional Context and Leadership Style: The Case of Newt Gingrich, in New
Majority or Old Minority? The Impact of Republicans on Congress, supra note 204, at 43,
53–55 (arguing the two parties have fundamentally different cultures, with Republicans
less likely to value and engage in compromise and coalition-building to move government
forward).
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cedure.”207 As early as Speaker Gingrich’s election as Speaker in 1994,
anti-Washington sentiment led the Republican leadership to decrease the
length of the congressional workweek and encourage members to spend
more time in their districts.208 Now, fewer members set up family
residences in D.C., decreasing social interactions across party lines209—
interactions needed to forge networks that facilitate coalition building
and compromise.210 Fueling this culture, some argue, is a highly partisan
and intemperate ultraconservative media that is as quick to excoriate
perceived defectors as to attack the opposition.211
A different kind of explanation for hyperpolarized Member behavior
does not require assigning particular blame to Republicans. Rather, it
focuses on the behavioral incentives created by the constitutional system of
separated and shared powers when neither party has a clear electoral
advantage. So long as one party has a reliable but not filibuster, or vetoproof, majority, both parties have incentives to compromise. This was the
situation during the mid-portion of the twentieth century, when Democrats
had seemingly unchallengable control of the House.212 Beginning in the
1980s, however, neither party has been able to rely on a large electoral
advantage.213 Instead, both parties have repeatedly gained, and lost,
control of the Senate, the House, and the presidency.214 In such conditions
207. Mike Lofgren, Goodbye to All That: Reﬂections of a GOP Operative Who Left the
Cult, Truthout (Sept. 3, 2011), http://www.truth-out.org/index.php?option=com_k2&view
=item&id=3079:goodbye-to-all-that-reﬂections-of-a-gop-operative-who-left-the-cult [http://
perma.cc/HZS4-X72U].
208. See Mann & Ornstein, Broken Branch, supra note 187, at 146–49; Mann &
Ornstein, Even Worse than It Looks, supra note 63, at 40.
209. See Mann & Ornstein, Broken Branch, supra note 187, at 146–49; Jonathan Haidt &
Sam Abrams, The Top Ten Reasons American Politics Are So Broken, Wash. Post: Wonkblog
(Jan. 7, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonkblog/wp/2015/01/07/the-top-10reasons-american-politics-are-worse-than-ever/ [http://perma.cc/85MN-U9MR].
210. See generally Matt Grossmann, Artists of the Possible: Governing Networks and
American Policy Change Since 1945, at 180–90 (2014) (examining sixty years of
policymaking and concluding amount of policy and its liberal or conservative content
emerge from coalition building and compromise among political elites).
211. See Galston & Nivola, supra note 145, at 21.
212. See Gary C. Jacobson, Explaining Divided Government: Why Can’t the
Republicans Win the House?, 24 Pol. Sci. & Pol. 640, 640–41 (1991) [hereinafter Jacobson,
Explaining Divided Government].
213. See Frances E. Lee, Presidents and Party Teams: The Politics of Debt Limits and
Executive Oversight, 2001–2013, 43 Pres. Stud. Q. 775, 777 (2013) (noting margins of
party control in House and Senate since 1980 have been half the size on average of
margins between 1933 and 1980).
214. Id.
“Since 1980 . . . control of the Senate shifted six times, with Democrats in the
majority for nine Congresses and Republicans for eight. Control of the House of
Representatives shifted three times, also with Democrats in the majority for nine
Congresses and Republicans for eight. Between 1981 and 2017, Republicans
held the presidency for 20 years and Democrats for 16 years.”
Id.
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of electoral parity—when a relatively small shift of voters can swing control
from one party to the other—incentives push toward behavior that Lee
calls “competitive team play”215 and Sean Theriault dubs “partisan
warfare.”216 Rather than compromise and accommodation, members of
both parties are motivated to engage in scorched-earth tactics intended
not merely to stymie the other side, even on noncontroversial issues, but
also to brand the opposition as incompetent, corrupt, or evil.217 The
electoral parity explanation for polarization is especially intriguing because
the same condition existed in the 1890 to 1910 era.218
In the end, both the Republican-specific explanation and the electoralparity explanation implicate the potentially significant difference, noted
earlier,219 between behavior rooted in ideology and behavior rooted in
strategy. Republican members who sincerely believe that highly public
failures of federal institutions and programs ultimately serve America’s
interests pose a different kind of challenge for abating polarization than
Republicans who believe that such failures strategically advantage the party
branding itself as anti-Washington/big-government.220 To be sure, team
affiliation can be a powerful psychological driver of aggressive, oppositional
behavior, but the whole point of win-at-any-cost behavior is for the team to
win. Polarization extreme enough to induce congressional gridlock may
prove not to be a winning strategy for the parties over time. The Pew study
revealed a majority of Americans saying they want political leaders to
compromise rather than hold out for their position.221 Matthew Levendusky
and Neil Malhoutra found that media coverage that exaggerates the degree
of polarization causes all but the strongest partisans to perceive a violation of
broadbased norms of moderation, compromise, and civility and to moderate
their own issue positions in reaction.222 Andrew Hall recently showed that, at
least in genuinely contested House primaries, nominating an extreme
candidate substantially decreases the party’s chances of winning the seat in
215. Lee, Beyond Ideology, supra note 35, at 48.
216. Sean Theriault, Partisan Warfare Is the Problem, in Political Polarization in
American Politics, supra note 34, at 11, 11–12 (Daniel J. Hopkins & John Sides eds., 2015)
[hereinafter Theriault, Partisan Warfare]. Theriault does regard Republicans as more
guilty of such tactics, see Sean Theriault, The Gingrich Senators: The Roots of Partisan
Warfare in Congress 88, 112, 127–29, 150–51 (2013), but the electoral parity explanation
itself does not require this.
217. See Theriault, Partisan Warfare, supra note 216, at 12–13; Thomas E. Mann, Admit
It, Political Scientists: Politics Really Is More Broken than Ever, Atlantic (May 26, 2014),
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/05/dysfunction/371544/ [http://perma.cc/
RZ8J-3BSC].
218. See Brady & Han, Then and Now, supra note 11, at 134.
219. See supra section I.C.
220. See Lofgren, supra note 207.
221. Pew, Beyond Red vs. Blue, supra note 77, at 24.
222. See Matthew Levendusky & Neil Malhoutra, Does Media Coverage of Partisan
Polarization Affect Political Attitudes?, 32 Pol. Comm. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at
5, 9–10) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
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the general election.223 Professor Fiorina has argued that periods of unified
government have been so brief in recent times because the party in power
governs as if it had been given an extreme ideological mandate and triggers
a voter backlash.224
To be sure, recognizing a counterproductive strategy is not reliably a
quick or straightforward process.225 Still, history suggests that parties do
adapt when sufficiently pressured. The 1890 to 1910 period of high
polarization was resolved through a series of incremental electoral shifts
that saw the Populist faction first gain control of the Democratic Party and
then lose it over a series of electoral defeats—which finally caused the
party to shift its policy positions.226 What seems key to this dynamic is a
series of losses at the polls that cause infighting, and redefinition, within
the losing party.227
D. The Role of Demographics
Although most political scientists agree that polarization in the
legislature cannot be accounted for by polarization in the broader
electorate,228 some argue that there is a relationship between certain
general demographic trends—number of immigrants and gap between
the wealthiest and poorest citizens; geographical segregation; and
education level—and rising congressional polarization. Beyond these
arguments, certain other demographic trends—particularly age and
ethnicity—are important potential sources of pressure on the parties to
adjust their current ideological platforms.
Some political scientists point to a strong correlation (graphed at
Appendix A) between polarization trends in the House and both income
inequality and the percentage of foreign-born noncitizens in the population.229 Of course, correlation does not necessarily imply causation,
223. Andrew B. Hall, What Happens When Extremists Win Primaries?, 109 Am. Pol.
Sci. Rev. 18, 32 (2015) (ﬁnding average electoral penalty so large it causes observable
ideological shift in district’s roll-call voting toward opposing party).
224. See Fiorina, Missing Moderates, supra note 59, at 58–60, 64 (recounting
Republican and Democratic predictions of generation-long realignment when uniﬁed
government was ﬁrst achieved).
225. Confirmation bias—the tendency to gather or interpret information in the way that
confirms one’s existing beliefs—is a problem, particularly in the case of emotional or deeply
entrenched beliefs. See Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon
in Many Guises, 2 Rev. Gen. Psychol. 175, 175–77 (1998) (reviewing literature on
phenomenon); cf. Thomas Gilovich, Biased Evaluation and Persistence in Gambling, 44 J.
Personality & Soc. Psychol. 1110, 1122–24 (1983) (examining why people continue to gamble
despite losses).
226. See Brady & Han, Then and Now, supra note 11, at 149.
227. Id. (tracing same dynamic in Irish and British politics).
228. See supra sections III.B–III.C.
229. See Nolan McCarthy, Keith T. Poole & Harold Rosenthal, Polarized America: The
Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches 1–2 (2006); Adam Bonica et al., Why Hasn’t
Democracy Slowed Rising Inequality?, 27 J. Econ. Persp. 103, 108 ﬁg.2 (2013).
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and these researchers openly acknowledge that cause and effect are hard
to disentangle.230 According to their argument, high-income citizens and
low-income citizens tend to support politicians with opposing views on
redistribution,231 thus contributing to polarization; at the same time,
polarization-induced legislative gridlock increases income inequality by,
for example, preventing cost-of-living adjustment to social programs.232
The rising number of legal and illegal immigrants fuels this dynamic by
swelling the ranks of the poorest residents. The resulting relative
improvement in income of the median voter further reduces electoral
pressure for wealth redistribution, which would be shared with the noncitizen poor.233 The ultimate position of these scholars seems to be that
polarization and the gap between rich and poor (including immigrants)
are mutually reinforcing trends. This assessment has not produced direct
proposals for change, although the most extended version of the
argument implies a connection between restricting immigration and
lowering polarization: It observes that the 1890 to 1910 previous high
point of polarization saw repeated efforts to restrict immigration that
ﬁnally succeeded in the 1920s, and that liberal immigration laws
reappeared in the mid–1960s and “prevailed for the rest of the
century.”234
The geographical segregation argument is most famously made in
The Big Sort, a 2008 book by journalist Bill Bishop arguing that since the
mid–1970s, Americans have increasingly chosen to live in politically likeminded communities.235 This homogeneity creates an echo chamber in
which beliefs are reinforced and ampliﬁed, fueling polarization.236
Although the book was widely discussed and recommended by notables
including former President Clinton,237 the political scientist reaction was
skeptical. Both the book’s methodology and Bishop’s interpretation were
questioned, with researchers generally concluding that geographical
segregation was far less extensive and signiﬁcant than suggested.238 The
230. See, e.g., McCarty, Poole & Rosenthal, supra note 229, at 2–3, 184–86.
231. See id. at 106–07.
232. See id. at 185–86 (discussing Temporary Assistance for Needy Families); Bonica et
al., supra note 229, at 120–21 (discussing minimum wage).
233. See McCarty, Poole & Rosenthal, supra note 229, at 136–38.
234. Id. at 188.
235. Bill Bishop with Robert G. Cushing, The Big Sort: Why the Clustering of LikeMinded America Is Tearing Us Apart (2008).
236. Id. at 227–28.
237. See The Big Sort, http://www.thebigsort.com/home.php [http://perma.cc/UN4NMZUZ] (last visited Aug. 12, 2015).
238. See, e.g., Samuel J. Abrams & Morris P. Fiorina, “The Big Sort” that Wasn’t: A
Skeptical Reexamination, 45 Pol. Sci. & Pol. 203, 208 (2012); Philip A. Klinkner, Counter
Response from Klinkner to Bishop and Cushing, 2 Forum, no. 2, art. 9, 2004, at 1–3; Philip
A. Klinkner, Red and Blue Scare: The Continuing Diversity of the American Electoral
Landscape, 2 Forum, no. 2, art. 2, 2004, at 9; Eric McGhee & Daniel Krimm, Party
Registration and the Geography of Party Polarization, 41 Polity 345, 365–67 (2009).
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most recent empirical work ﬁnds that some geographical sorting has
occurred, but that it is a much more recent phenomenon than Bishop
claims.239 Moreover, most sorting occurs in the South and appears to be
the legacy of the partisan realignment of voters rather than migration.240
Sorting in other regions is more explained by voter mobility, although
researchers are quick to disclaim the contention that people are
intentionally picking their neighborhood based on its partisan
makeup.241 Of course, the echo-chamber effect could occur even if
geographical homogeneity results from lifestyle preferences (e.g.,
conservatives tending to prefer rural and other exurban areas and
liberals tending to value urban amenities). The Pew 2014 study found
evidence of such differences among consistent liberals and consistent
conservatives, although it also found that “[t]he preferences of less
ideological Americans are more varied.”242 Moreover, there is evidence
that the most rapidly growing suburban counties are becoming more
heterogenous as minorities (especially Latinos) move to areas of
expanding employment opportunity.243
Rising education levels is another demographic trend that has drawn
attention, with some researchers making a causal claim that higher
education makes liberals more liberal and conservatives more
conservative.244 Some even go so far as to link education with biology
through “assortative mating”—the tendency of individuals to look for
partners with similar characteristics such as education level and political
preferences—to predict an increasingly ideologically extreme population
over a few generations.245 The proposition that a more educated citizenry
is a more polarized citizenry is surely one of the most dismal strands of
the literature on polarization. It is also a leap from the existing research,
239. See Corey Lang & Shanna Pearson-Merkowitz, Partisan Sorting in the United
States, 1972–2012: New Evidence from a Dynamic Analysis, Pol. Geography, Sept. 2015, at
119, 121–25.
240. See id. at 9–10. That is, the failure of older white Southern Democrats to change
their registered party affiliation created a false appearance of political heterogeneity that
was gradually corrected, as these voters were replaced by younger conservative voters who
properly sorted themselves by registering Republican. See id. at 2 (considering theory of
Green, Palmquist, and Schickler).
241. See id. at 10.
242. Pew, Polarization in the Public, supra note 70, at 45.
243. Jonathan Rodden, Geography and Gridlock in the United States, in Solutions to
Political Polarization in America, supra note 16, at 104, 112.
244. See, e.g., Abramowitz, Disappearing Center, supra note 22, at 120–27; Avi Tuschman,
Our Political Nature: The Evolutionary Origins of What Divides Us 123, 425–26 (2013)
[hereinafter Tuschman, Our Political Nature]; Avi Tuschman, Why Americans Are So Polarized:
Education and Evolution, Atlantic (Feb. 28, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/
archive/2014/02/why-americans-are-so-polarized-education-and-evolution/284098/ [http://
perma.cc/W84G-7NFT] [hereinafter Tuschman, Why Americans Are So Polarized].
245. See Tuschman, Our Political Nature, supra note 244, at 168–69; Casey A. Klofstad,
Rose McDermott & Peter K. Hakim, The Dating Preferences of Liberals and Conservatives,
35 Pol. Behav. 519, 531–32 (2013).
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and there is some counter evidence. In general, the literature on the
effects of intelligence and education on political attitudes is extensive
and nuanced.246 A group of studies show a correlation between higher
education (and higher income) and greater ideological coherence.247 Once
again, a correlation does not establish causation—it is equally “possible
that more ideologically consistent individuals choose to complete more
years of education”248—and greater consistency is not the same as greater
ideological extremism.249 If a relationship between more education and
more polarized political attitudes does exist, that connection should be
most evident in young adults. The Millennials are the most well-educated
generational cohort in U.S. history, with more than 60% having attended
some college.250 There does not appear to be relevant academic research
focused on this group, but the 2014 Pew study shows less ideological
consistency among younger voters.251 The two largest clusters of eighteen
to twenty-nine year olds are Young Outsiders, who are conservative on
government but liberal on many social issues including immigration and
the environment,252 and Next Generation Left, who are liberal on social
issues but generally positive about Wall Street and concerned about the
246. See, e.g., Christine Ma-Kellams et al., Not All Education Is Equally Liberal: The
Effects of Science Education on Political Attitudes, 2 J. Soc. & Pol. Psychol. 143, 143–46
(2014) (reviewing this literature); Heiner Rindermann, Carmen Flores-Mendoza &
Michael A. Woodley, Political Orientations, Intelligence and Education, 40 Intelligence
217, 217–20 (2012) (same); see also Kyle Dodson, The Effect of College on Social and
Political Attitudes and Civic Participation, in Professors and Their Politics 135, 150–56
(Neil Gross & Solon Simmons eds., 2014) (arguing effect of education is complex and
depends on students’ incoming characteristics: academic aspects moderate opinion among
those who come in less politically engaged while social aspects make politically engaged
incoming students more extreme via echo-chamber effect of self-selected social networks).
247. See, e.g., Baldassarri & Gelman, supra note 123, at 436; George F. Bishop, The
Effect of Education on Ideological Consistency, 40 Pub. Opinion Q. 337, 344 (1976); see also
Rindermann, Flores-Mendoza & Woodley, supra note 246, at 7 (discussing Brazilian data).
248. Jaclyn Kaslovsky, The Effect of Education on Ideological Polarization in the U.S.
Congress: An Instrument Variable Analysis 6 (2015) (unpublished manuscript),
http://www.politics.as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/5628/Kaslovsky.pdf [http://perma.cc/X5LS-TH8K].
This thesis is a rare effort to test the polarizing effect of education directly on members of
Congress.
249. For more on the problem of confusing measures of consistency with extremism,
see supra section III.B.3.c.
250. See Council of Econ. Advisers, 15 Economic Facts About Millennials 3 (2014),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/millennials_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/
A5UN-5B85] (citing census data).
251. See Drew DeSilver, The Politics of American Generations: How Age Affects
Attitudes and Voting Behavior, Pew Research Ctr.: FactTank (July 9, 2014), http://
www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/07/09/the-politics-of-american-generations-howage-affects-attitudes-and-voting-behavior/ [http://perma.cc/QU6Y-P3GH]. An earlier
report had similarly detailed cross cutting liberal and conservative preferences among the
preceding cohort Generation X voters. See Pew Research Ctr., The Generation Gap and
the 2012 Election 75–81 (2011), http://www.people-press.org/ﬁles/legacy-pdf/11-311%20Generations%20Release.pdf [http://perma.cc/YQ8H-46UV].
252. See supra text accompanying note 136.
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costs of maintaining the social safety net.253 Together these clusters
account for 38% of this age group, while another 19% fall into the other
two heavily cross-pressured clusters, Faith and Family Left and HardPressed Skeptics.254
Finally, there are demographic trends that suggest the likelihood of
partisan shifting rather than the entrenchment of polarization. The
apparent ideological inconsistency of younger voters is an obvious source
of pressure on both parties to modify their issue positions to attract these
voters.255 More broadly, the Republican voter base is “overwhelmingly
white, older, married, religiously observant, and socially conservative—all
shrinking demographic categories.”256 In particular, the proportion of
Latino and Asian voters has grown rapidly, and this growth is projected to
continue.257 The Democratic Party is generally seen as having the edge in
these demographic trends,258 but there is signiﬁcant cross-pressuring that
creates vulnerabilities for Democrats and opportunities for Republicans.
For example, Latinos as a group are more religious than the median
American, leading to more conservative positions on social issues like
abortion.259 Millennials—currently the largest and most racially diverse
cohort in the U.S.260—tend to be socially liberal and environmentally
concerned, but they are also economically stressed by educational debt

253. See supra text accompanying note 137.
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come”).
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Wash. Post: Monkey Cage (Jan. 20, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkeycage/wp/2014/01/20/how-race-and-religion-have-polarized-american-voters/ [http://perma.cc
/2CAL-5U6H].
258. See, e.g., Pew, Deep Dive, supra note 256, at 1.
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Identity, Pew Research Ctr. (Apr. 4, 2012), http://www.pewhispanic.org/2012/04/04/vpolitics-values-and-religion/ [http://perma.cc/N5AC-A2VS].
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and recession-constrained employment opportunities,261 and worried
about the cost of the social safety net.262
In sum, some researchers emphasize demographic trends that
support a bleak prognosis for depolarizing shifts because these trends
would be either extremely difficult or socially undesirable to reverse. The
evidence that any of these trends contribute causally to congressional
polarization is thin. At the same time, changes in key electoral
demographics are likely to challenge both parties over the next several
election cycles to reposition themselves in ways that attract members of
various cross-pressured groups.
E.

The Bottom Line

The challenge in explaining and trying to reverse, congressional
polarization is discovering whether something has been introduced (or,
conceivably, removed) in the last few decades that both amplifies “normal”
American political conflict over governing and entrenches it so that the
historically observed ebb and flow in the levels of legislative partisanism
can no longer be expected to occur. Theories about causation and remedy
abound and, in some instances, directly compete, but substantiating
evidence is rare. So far, at least, it does not appear that some identifiable
“big bang” set contemporary congressional polarization in motion and
continues inexorably to drive it. Rather, multiple factors probably
contribute to the current situation. This should not be surprising given the
complex of legal, political, cultural, and demographic elements that
constitute two-party government in a system of separated and shared
powers in a large, heterogeneous nation.
Whether this is cause for pessimism or optimism depends on one’s
perspective. A multiplicity of contributing factors means there is no
obvious solution—but also means that stasis is unlikely. Indeed, major
shifts in electorally relevant demographics will create pressure on both
parties—especially the Republican Party—to undergo the kind of
redeﬁnition of issue positions that has abated congressional polarization
in the past.
CONCLUSION: GETTING PAST POLARIZATION
“[M]ost of the imbalances I have analyzed . . . have not been major,
permanent, systemic problems. More precisely, at least during recent generations,

261. See id. at 16–17, 23–26.
262. See Pew, Beyond Red vs. Blue, supra note 77, at 9; cf. Millennials in Adulthood:
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many alleged problems have proven to be nonexistent, short-term, limited,
tolerable, or correctable.”
~ David Mayhew263
The system of horizontally and vertically separated, shared and checked
powers laid out by the Constitution is extraordinarily complex when
operationalized in a nation of 435 congressional and fifty Senate districts
comprising 319 million people. As the previous sections demonstrate, just
uncovering the facts about political behavior, and its underlying motivations
and causes, can be extremely difficult. With respect to congressional polarization, political science research has provided two competing accounts.
The standard, parsimonious account, based on roll-call voting
records, reveals a Congress that is ever more broadly, deeply, and
consistently divided. This account is complemented by a view of the
electorate in which the knowledgeable and politically engaged are
increasingly polarized, ideologically and culturally. This account supports
the pessimistic prognosis of chronic hyperpartisanship and congressional
dysfunction. Never before in history has the level of polarization been so
high or the upward trend so relentless.
The alternative, more complex account, based on a range of qualitative
and quantitative evidence, sees motivation and opportunities for cross-party
coalitions in Congress persisting even in the face of strong ideological and
strategic partisan pressures. This account is complemented by a view of an
electorate in which even strong party-identifiers disagree with their party on
some issues, identifiable subgroups have bundles of liberal and conservative
preferences, most people say they want government officials to compromise,
and only a minority believes that either party currently represents them well.
This account could not be categorized as optimistic about Congress’s future,
but it is at least possibilistic about a shift in contemporary institutional
dysfunction. History reveals that partisan conflict is the norm in American
government, and Congress has recovered from past periods of debilitatingly
high conflict.
Choosing between these accounts may have more to do with one’s
individual brain physiology than with objectively veriﬁable facts.264
When, however, the focus shifts from descriptions of the current
state of congressional polarization to predictions about its future course
and prescriptions for reform, the historical record seems clearly on the
side of skepticism and wariness.
In the 1950s, the American Political Science Association (APSA)
emphatically urged the major parties to become more ideologically
263. Mayhew, Partisan Balance, supra note 46, at 190 (emphasis omitted).
264. Cf. John R. Hibbing, Kevin B. Smith & John R. Alford, Differences in Negativity
Bias Underlie Variations in Political Ideology, 37 Behav. & Brain Sci. 297, 303–04 (2014)
(arguing physiological neurological basis for observed variations in levels of negativity bias
is “the principal that negative events are more salient, potent, dominant in combinations,
and generally efficacious than positive events”(internal quotation marks omitted)).
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cohesive, programmatic, and divergent in order to give voters a sharply
defined, genuine choice.265 For “responsible” government, APSA argued,
the parties must be integrated, loyal, and highly disciplined so that they
might act on and be held accountable for their promised program.266 In
other words, during the nostalgically recalled mid-century era of low
polarization, the wisdom of the day was that what Americans really needed
was the kind of parties we have today.267
In the 1960s, the target for institutional reform was the senioritydriven committee system of governance in the House. This system—
which was rooted in reforms now viewed as helping to reverse the high
polarization of the 1890 to 1910 era268—was condemned for creating
autonomous ﬁefdoms that undermined the power of party leaders and
prevented adoption of a coherent legislative program.269 The committee
system was ﬁnally “ﬁxed” in the Republican Revolution in 1995, when
Speaker Gingrich initiated the changes270 many now blame for
enhancing extremist voices, punishing defections from the party line,
and burying measures with bipartisan support.271
The 1970s problematized rising congressional incumbency rates.272 To
remedy this “electoral stagnation,”273 term limits and other reform
proposals sought greater democratic accountability through greater
turnover among Members.274 Now, it appears that turnover has been
driving ideological divergence within Congress, with new members
265. See Am. Political Sci. Ass’n Comm. on Political Parties, Toward a More
Responsible Two-Party System, 44 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 1, 1–14 (1950).
266. See id. at 1–2, 6–9.
267. For a prescient response that this would be disastrous, see Evron M. Kirkpatrick,
“Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System”: Political Science, Policy Science, or
Pseudo Science?, 65 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 965, 969–71 (1971).
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Galston & Nivola, supra note 145, at 34; Hetherington, supra note 17, at 424.
270. See Deering & Smith, supra note 187, 47–53 (describing reforms that
substantially increased power of “corporate party leadership, and the Speaker in
particular . . . at the expense of committees and committee chairs”).
271. See supra section IV.B.
272. See, e.g., David R. Mayhew, Congressional Elections: The Case of the Vanishing
Marginals, 6 Polity 295, 304 (1974); cf. John A. Ferejohn, On the Decline of Competition
in Congressional Elections, 71 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 166, 167 (1977) (critiquing various
explanations offered for phenomenon).
273. Although Professor Mayhew himself did not use the phrase “electoral stagnation,” it
is now the standard terminology for lack of competitiveness in House elections. See, e.g.,
James E. Campbell, The Stagnation of Congressional Elections, in Life After Reform: When
the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act Meets Politics 141, 142 (Michael J. Malbin ed., 2003)
(crediting Professor Mayhew with initial work on this problem).
274. See John David Rausch, Jr., When a Popular Idea Meets Congress: The History of
the Term Limit Debate in Congress, 1 Pol. Bureaucracy & Just. 34, 38 (2009) (describing
efforts of Foundation for Study of Presidential and Congressional Terms in approaching
“subject of congressional term limits from a scholarly perspective” throughout 1970s).

47

contributing most to the perceived disconnect between representatives
and most of those they represent.275
Throughout the 1980s, the renaissance of conservative constitutional
theory within academia and the Reagan Administration created the strong
unitary executive interpretation that systematically empowered the President
at the expense of Congress.276 This sea change in separation-of-powers
theory was a rational policy development given established political wisdom
of the day: Due to a variety of demographic and structural factors,
Republicans would likely control the Presidency over time, while Democrats
had a lock on the House.277 Today, these same factors favor continued
Republican dominance of the House and suggest that mostly Democratic
presidents will likely reap the benefits of unitary executive theory.278
Obviously, there are limits to even the best efforts to diagnose and
“ﬁx” problems with the structure of government set up by the
Constitution.
This humbling recognition ought to restrain any instinct to dismiss,
as naïve or pollyannaish, Professor Mayhew’s assessment that the system
has developed self-correcting impulses that enable the House, Senate,
and presidency, over time, generally to work the way they are supposed
to.279 In the months surrounding this Symposium, important instances of
bipartisan accommodation began to emerge from Congress. The Senate
overwhelmingly approved legislation establishing congressional review of
the proposed Iran nuclear deal; in the process, Senate Majority Leader
Mitch McConnell used his procedural power against newer Republican
members to prevent “tougher” amendments that would have cost
Democratic support.280 The House, by a strong bipartisan vote, passed a
legislative package that solved a longstanding problem with fees paid to
Medicare physicians,281 even as some Republicans complained that it
275. See supra section I.B.
276. See Richard J. Ellis, The Development of the American Presidency 333–36 (2012).
277. See, e.g., Jacobson, Explaining Divided Government, supra note 212, at 640;
Steven Taylor, Whatever Happened to the Republican ‘Lock’ on the Electoral College?, 7
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(Jan. 6, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2015/01/06/the-gops-2016problem-in-3-maps/ [http://perma.cc/UWK2-TS5F] (predicting consistent Democratic success
in Electoral College).
279. See Mayhew, Partisan Balance, supra note 46, at 190.
280. See Paul Kane & Mike DeBonis, Senate Approves Bill on Reviewing a Proposed
Nuclear Deal with Iran, Wash. Post (May 7, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/mcconnell-on-verge-of-clearing-big-hurdle-on-iran-review-legislation/2015/05/07/a2745
5be-f42c-11e4-b2f3-af5479e6bbdd_story.html?wpisrc=al_alert [http://perma.cc/5QXA-KRGV].
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Do It?, Wash. Post: Monkey Cage (Mar. 26, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs
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added to the deﬁcit.282 A ﬂurry of bipartisan negotiation resulted in the
Senate approving fast-track authority for the Trans-Paciﬁc Partnership
negotiations, despite opposition from the right and the left,283 and House
Speaker Boehner meted out discipline to a group of fractious Republican
members who tried, unsuccessfully, to derail its bipartisan passage in the
House.284 An overwhelmingly bipartisan House vote approved the USA
Freedom Act as a compromise approach to government collection of
phone records.285 In each instance, the other chamber also eventually
acted with bipartisan majorities—and over the opposition of some
Republican legislators.286
To be sure, these events are not enough to discredit the dark prophecies of a rancorous and gridlocked future with which this Essay began.
They do, however, show that Congress retains the capacity for negotiating
agreement on important policy problems, and they intimate a system still
open to ameliorating adjustments. The best way to “solve” congressional
polarization may be to multiply the opportunities for institutional selfcorrection to happen—in Laurel Harbridge’s terminology, for bipartisan
common ground to emerge.287 Gillian Metzger’s companion essay
considers the possible role of the administrative state in this regard.
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APPENDIX A288
FIGURE A1: HOUSE POLARIZATION VS. PERCENT FOREIGN BORN 1879–2013

FIGURE A2: INCOME INEQUALITY AND POLITICAL POLARIZATION 1947–2012

288. Polarized America: The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches, Voteview,
http://voteview.com/Polarized_America.htm [http://perma.cc/G3PB-ZPDV] (last visited
Aug. 17, 2015).

50

